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ABSTRACT
A Smart Grid is a digitally enabled electric power grid that integrates the computation and
communication technologies from cyber world with the sensors and actuators from physical world.
Due to the system complexity, typically the high cohesion of communication and power system,
the Smart Grid innovation introduces new and fundamentally different security vulnerabilities and
risks. In this work, two important research aspects about cyber-physical security of Smart Grid are
addressed: (i) The construction, impact and countermeasure of data integrity attacks; and (ii) The
design and implementation of general cyber-physical security experiment platform.
For data integrity attacks: based on the system model of state estimation process in Smart
Grid, firstly, a data integrity attack model is formulated, such that the attackers can generate fi-
nancial benefits from the real-time electrical market operations. Then, to reduce the required
knowledge about the targeted power system when launching attacks, an online attack approach
is proposed, such that the attacker is able to construct the desired attacks without the network in-
formation of power system. Furthermore, a network information attacking strategy is proposed, in
which the most vulnerable meters can be directly identified and the desired measurement perturba-
tions can be achieved by strategically manipulating the network information. Besides the attacking
strategies, corresponding countermeasures based on the sparsity of attack vectors and robust state
estimator are provided respectively.
For the experiment platform: ScorePlus, a software-hardware hybrid and federated experi-
ment environment for Smart Grid is presented. ScorePlus incorporates both software emulator
and hardware testbed, such that they all follow the same architecture, and the same Smart Grid
application program can be tested on either of them without any modification; ScorePlus provides
a federated environment such that multiple software emulators and hardware testbeds at different
locations are able to connect and form a unified Smart Grid system; ScorePlus software is encap-
sulated as a resource plugin in OpenStack cloud computing platform, such that it supports massive
deployments with large scale test cases in cloud infrastructure.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we first introduce the main background of the thesis: the Smart Grid and the
Cyber-Physical Security of Smart Grid. Then we present our research focus.
1.1 Introduction
Power system is the most fundamental and complicated artificial system in human society. In
United States, there are over 5,000 power plants, over 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission,
and over 5.5 million miles of distribution lines [1]. The traditional power system evolves very little
over the past 50 years, which results in significant inefficiency and vulnerability. As reported in
[1], the annual cost to U.S businesses of power outages and distribution loss is greater than $100
billion.
1.1.1 Smart Grid
With the help of the emerging information technology, the legacy power grid is evolved along
the journey to Smart Grid. A Smart Grid is a complex cyber-physical intelligent power system
which leverages the cyber infrastructure within power system for sensing, control, computation
and communication, in order to achieve self healing, resilience, sustainability and efficiency. It
holds great promise for revolutionizing the energy future to deliver cleaner and more efficient
power, healthier air and lower carbon emissions [2]. Currently, the design architectures and imple-
mentation models for smart grid are still evolving and not finalized. One of the most well known
common reference model of smart grid is proposed by the U.S National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in [3]. A conceptual view of the NISTs smart grid reference model is depicted
in Figure 1.1. The NISTs model is composed of seven domains: generation, transmission, distri-
bution, customers, markets, operations, and service providers. The two-way electrical flows are
2moving across the top four domains (power generation, transmission, distribution, and customer),
which are controlled and managed by the bottom three domains (market, operations, and service
providers) through communication flows. In addition, three typical customers are listed: Home
Area Network (HAN), Building Area Network(BAN) and Industrial Area Network (IAN), where
the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) takes place to monitor and manage the power and
information flows through smart meters.
Figure 1.1 NIST reference model for smart grid
1.1.2 Cyber-Physical Security of Smart Grid
The Smart Grid vision is being realized through the implementation of cyber infrastructure
overlaying the legacy physical power system. The cyber infrastructure enables the monitoring and
control from millions of distributed end-points such as smart meters, sensors, automated control
devices, all of which are interconnected by wired/wireless communication network. These features
improve the efficiency, reliability, and sustainability of electric power system. However, the beauty
3of the smart grid innovation comes with its danger: the integration and dependency upon cyber
infrastructure would exceedingly increase the chances of cyber-physical threats and attacks. It
might allows the attackers to intrude the communication network, acquire access to critical control
routines, and even manipulate the meter measurements and system parameters to destabilize and
perturb the physical power system in unpredictable ways, which could result in serious unstable
power operating conditions, incorrect pricing scheme and even disastrous blackout.
The significance of cyber-physical security in smart grid lies in two folds. On the one hand,
critical control processes such as state estimation, economic dispatch, load aggregation and de-
mand response, etc, all rely on a secure and robust cyber infrastructure, which are indispensable to
all aspects of smart grid. On the other hand, the cyber vulnerabilities may also enable adversaries
to manipulate meter measurements, system parameters and price information, and even intrude and
acquire direct access to these critical routines, to destabilize the grid in unpredictable ways. In the
roadmap to secure control system proposed by Department of Energy and Department of Home-
land security [4], energy control systems are subject to targeted cyber attacks. Potential adversaries
have pursued progressively devious means to exploit flaws in system components, telecommuni-
cation methods, and common operating systems with intent to infiltrate and sabotage vulnerable
control systems. Sophisticated cyber attack tools require little technical knowledge to use and can
be found on the Internet, as can manufacturers technical specifications for popular control system
equipment. As mentioned in [5], security issues are considered as one of the highest priorities
for the smart grid design. Therefore, the cyber-physical security in smart grid has become a key
concern with increasing urgency for the research community.
1.2 The Focus of This Work
The nature of threats and vulnerabilities are constantly changing, so application of best cur-
rent practices for security is necessary but not sufficient. Therefore, for cyber-physical security
research of Smart Grid, on one hand, it is essential to expose the potential new risks and explore
corresponding countermeasures to mitigate the effects. One the other hand, it is also indispensable
to design and implement experiment platforms to vividly evaluate and demonstrate these ideas.
4In this work, two important research aspects about cyber-physical security of Smart Grid
are addressed: (i) The construction, impact and countermeasure of data integrity attacks; and (ii)
The design and implementation of general cyber-physical security experiment platform. For data
integrity attacks: based on the system model of state estimation process in Smart Grid, firstly, a
data integrity attack model is formulated, such that the attackers can generate financial benefits
from the real-time electrical market operations. Then, to reduce the required knowledge about
the targeted power system when launching attacks, an online attack approach is proposed, such
that the attacker is able to construct the desired attacks without the network information of power
system. Furthermore, a network information attacking strategy is proposed, in which the most
vulnerable meters can be directly identified and the desired measurement perturbations can be
achieved by strategically manipulating the network information. Besides the attacking strategies,
corresponding countermeasures based on the sparsity of attack vectors and robust state estimator
are provided respectively. For the experiment platform: ScorePlus, a software-hardware hybrid and
federated experiment environment for Smart Grid, is presented. Compared with previous related
works, ScorePlus incorporates both software emulator and hardware testbed, such that they all
follow the same architecture, and the same Smart Grid application program can be tested on either
of them without any modification. ScorePlus provides a federated environment such that multiple
software emulators and hardware testbeds at different locations are able to connect and form a
unified Smart Grid system. ScorePlus software is encapsulated as a resource plugin in OpenStack
cloud computing platform, such that it supports massive deployments with large scale test cases in
cloud infrastructure.
The rest of thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we survey the related works in the
literature. In Chapter 3, we introduce the data integrity attack model and problem formulation.
Then in Chapter 4 and 5, we respectively present the online data integrity attack [6] and leverage-
point based data integrity attack [7], and the corresponding countermeasures based on the sparsity
of attack vectors and robust state estimator are also provided. In Chapter 6, we present ScorePlus
[8], a software-hardware hybrid and federated experiment environment for Smart Grid. Finally we
conclude this work in Chapter 7.
5CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORKS
In this chapter we discuss the related works in the literature. First we cover the relevant works
in data integrity attacks of Smart Grid. Then we present related works in smart grid experiment
platforms.
2.1 Data Integrity Attacks in Smart Grid
Data integrity attacks refer to the kind of cyber attacks in which an adversary controls a set of
meters in state estimation process [9] and is able to alter the measurements from those meters. As
a recent and appealing attack paradigm, quite a few of existing works have addressed the issue.
2.1.1 Attack and Defense Strategy of Data Integrity Attacks in Smart Grid
In [10], Liu et al. are firstly introduced the concept of data integrity attacks in Smart Grid.
Assuming the attacker keeps the original power network topology data and parameter data intact,
the authors shows that the attacker can inject errors to the meter measurement data in certain ways
while without being detected by the existing bad data detector. Inspired by the work in [10],
extensive further developments are made in [11] [12] [13] [14] [15], etc. Different undetectable
attacks and defence strategies are presented. In [16], the authors at first introduce another class
of malicious data attacks, called topology attack. The key innovation is that the manipulations of
power network topology data are also considered.
2.1.2 Explore the Impact of Data Integrity Attacks in Smart Grid
Besides the pure attack and defense strategies of data integrity attacks, quite a few works
also endeavor to investigate the impact of it, particularly on the operations of real-time electrical
markets. Xie et al. in [17] firstly investigate the impact of integrity attacks on power market
6through virtual bidding. In [18], Kosut et al. evaluate the proposed data attacks by their generated
market revenues and the work is further studied by Jia et al. in pursuit of maximizing the revenues
[19]. Yuan et al. in [20] show that the data integrity attacks can lead to increased system operating
costs due to inordinate generation dispatch or energy routing. With the objective of controlling real-
time Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) directly through data attacks, Tan et al. in [21] employ a
control theory based approach to analyze the attack effect on pricing stability. Esmalifalak et al.
in [22] novelly adopt a two-person zero-sum game approach to characterize the relations between
attackers and defenders within electricity pricing. More recently, the authors in [23] and [24]
have respectively proposed formal analytic frameworks to quantify the impact of data qualities on
real-time LMP.
2.1.3 Remarks and Our Contributions
There are several issues with respect to the related works in data integrity attacks of Smart
Grid. First, the above related works are based on the assumption that the attacker has full knowl-
edge about the network information of targeted power systems, which includes network topology
data and branch parameter data, etc. In fact, in any given power system, the network information
is huge and highly secured, and more importantly, these information are dynamic since the net-
work topology could be reconfigured in both normal situations and contingencies. Therefore, it
is rather difficult for attackers to achieve complete awareness of network information in practice.
Second, the above works usually consider the manipulations of meter measurement data, and the
errors introduced by the attacker to the meter measurements have to be in the column space of the
Jacobian matrix of the state estimation system model. It is also essential to explore the manip-
ulations of network topology data and branch parameter data. Finally, even though the previous
works have indicated the impact of data integrity attacks on real-time electrical market operations,
the relationships between these two are not explicitly characterized or integrated into the attackers’
objectives.
In the light of above issues, in Chapter 3, we introduce the data integrity attack model, and ex-
plicitly characterize the relationship between data integrity attacks and real-time electrical market
7operations as a process simulator. A global simulation-based optimization problem is formulated
such that the attackers can maximize its financial revenues from the constructed attacks. Then
to reduce the required network information of targeted power system when launching attacks, we
propose an online attack construction approach [6] in Chapter 4, by which the attacker is able to
construct the desired attacks without the network information. Furthermore, a network information
attacking strategy LPAttack [7], is proposed in Chapter 5, in which the most vulnerable meters can
be directly identified and the desired measurement perturbations can be achieved by strategically
manipulating the network information. Besides the attacking strategies, corresponding counter-
measures based on the sparsity of attack vectors and robust state estimator are also provided in
each chapter.
2.2 Experiment Platforms for Smart Grid
Smart Grid is an intelligent power system that involves various embedded devices for sensing,
control, computation and communication. Validating the functionality, security and reliability of
Smart Grid applications within such a system requires the modeling and emulation of both power
networks and communication networks, as well as the interactions between them. The design and
implementation of experiment environment for Smart Grid are challenging and have been studied
for years. In this section, we conduct extensive survey about the previous related efforts, which
can be summarized into two categories: real hardware testbed and software simulation.
2.2.1 Real hardware testbed approach
Real hardware testbeds are the platforms employing actual physical smart grid devices for
the experiments. We further classifies this line of works into two subcategories: flat-out hardware
platforms and hardware-in-the-loop platforms.
Flat-out hardware platform: The flat-out hardware platforms are the ones which consist
of pure hardware devices. As a grid scale, the Korean government selected the whole Jeju Is-
land to build the Smart Grid testbed to allow the testing of Smart Grid technologies and business
8models [25]. In [26], the Idaho National Lab incorporates the actual Smart Grid components in-
cluding power generators, storage batteries, and substations to facilitate the cyber security research
of power transmission in Smart Grid. In [27], Renewable Energy Laboratory in Greece set up a
central-controlled testbed consisting of PV-panels, battery banks and inverters to investigate the re-
newable integration issues. As a lab scale, the authors in [28] design SmartGridLab testbed, which
consists of intelligent power switch, power generator, renewable energy sources, smart appliances,
and power meter, in order to test distributed demand response algorithm in Smart Grid. In [29],
Joyer et al. demonstrate a lab scale microgrid testbed, which is based on IEEE 1547 to serve as an
interconnection standard.
Hardware-in-the-loop platform: In hardware-in-the-loop platforms, the hardware devices
only serve as parts of platforms, and need to interact with other software simulations to conduct
complete experiments. Hahn et al. in [30] employs devices like Programmable Logic Units (PLUs)
and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) for communication networks and Real-Time Digtial Sim-
ulators for power network simulation. Stanovich et al. in [31] integrates hardware from energy
field, such as Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), fiber optical cables within the testbed. Recently, the
author in [32] employs devices like smart meters, phasor measurement units, phasor data concen-
trator, and hybrid vehicle charging system, as the essential components of microgrid testbed in
lab.
2.2.2 Software simulation approach
The software simulation platforms for Smart Grid are entirely composed of software compo-
nents, which can also be further classified into two subcategories: individual simulation platforms
and co-simulation platforms.
Individual simulation platforms: Individual simulation platforms are those which encap-
sulate the simulation features into one process. In other words, it is one single simulator to com-
plete the job. These platforms are usually focused on a particular aspect of interests for Smart
Grid. In [33], Guo et al. implement an energy demand management simulator to predict the per-
9formance and response of a self-adaptive demand management strategy. In [34], Molderink et al.
design and develop a simulation environment from scratch to analyze control algorithms for var-
ious appliances, such as micro-generators, energy buffers and water heater, etc. In [35], Faria et
al. describe Demsi, a simulator for demand response in the context of competitive electricity mar-
kets and intensive use of distributed generation. Energy service provider and demand side player
are modeled and strategic decisions are evaluated. In [36], Narayan et al. propose GridSpice, a
cloud-based simulation package for Smart Grid. Employing the well known distribution network
simulator Gridlab-D [37] and the transmission network simulator Matpower [38], GridSpice is
being developed iteratively with an ultimate goal of modeling the interactions between all parts
of the electrical network, including generation, transmission, distribution, storage and loads. All
the individual software platforms can complete their own tasks in the specific application domain,
but they all just concentrate on the power network simulation. The communication network, as
another critical component of Smart Grid, is not considered in these platforms. This is why the
co-simulation platform comes to the picture.
Co-simulation platforms: Co-simulation (co-operative simulation) is a simulation method-
ology that allows individual components to be simulated by different simulation tools running si-
multaneously and exchanging information in a collaborative manner [39]. In [40], Hopkinson et al.
present a federated simulation combining NS2, a discrete event network simulator with PSCAD, a
continuous time power network simulator. In [41], Godfrey et al. simulate the Smart Grid using
NS2 and OpenDSS, a power network simulator. In [42], Mallouhi et al. introduce a co-simulation
testbed specifically for security analysis of SCADA system by employing PowerWorld simulator
and OPNET. In [43] and [44], Lin et al. introduces a global event queue to synchronize NS2 and
PSLF simulation.
The co-simulation approach typically requires iteratively running separate communication
and power network simulations. The performance is affected by putting extra overhead of an in-
termediary of synchronization. Meanwhile, the interactions between communication and power
system models are usually restricted to fixed synchronization interval. Mismatches can occur be-
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tween the real dynamics and the simulated one, which exposes reliability issues of such systems.
An improvement about this issue is to integrate one simulation component into the other, such
that a single global clock and event queue is employed in the simulation engine. In [45], electric
network is made into a component within OMNET++, a network simulator. In [46], the adevs sim-
ulation tools are integrated into NS2 to provide a hybrid modeling of the continuous time power
system and discrete event communication system by the discretization of the continuous power
dynamics. More recently, a few of co-simulation frameworks are developed to further improve
the interoperability between multiple individual simulation platforms. [47] introduce FNCS, a co-
simulation framework to incorporate multiple power system simulators (Matpower, GridLAB-D)
and communication network simulator (NS3). [48] present Mosaik, which allows the Smart Grid
users to combine thousands of simulated entities distributed over multiple simulator processes.
2.2.3 Remarks about related work
From the above literature review, we summarize the characteristics of the real hardware
testbed approach and the software simulation approach for experiments in Smart Grid.
The real hardware testbed approach achieves high fidelity by employing dedicated devices
as part of the platforms. Critical control programs, such as demand response algorithms, routing
protocols, and security strategies, can be tested in real hardware testbeds and they could be directly
migrated to the actual Smart Grid embedded devices. However, the substantial cost and resource
needed to deploy these devices limits the repeatability of these efforts in a lab environment. More-
over, these testbeds cannot be accessed and shared remotely by the public research community and
are difficult to scale when the test case becomes quite large.
The software simulations, on the other hand, achieve much better availability, usability and
scalability. Within software simulation platforms, the models of various Smart Grid objects can
be easily scaled and statistically analyzed. However, since software simulation typically abstracts
the operating system, communication protocols and power dynamics into various mathematical
simulation models, it can only duplicate the behavior and structure of the system, but not the
execution environment of Smart Grid applications. Moreover, many of the recent smart grid cases
11
are hard to model because either they are in binary executable forms (e.g. malware codes), or
evolve too rapidly (attack vectors), which makes the simulation development labor-intensive and
error-prone.
2.2.4 Our approach: Software-Hardware Hybrid and Federated Experiment Environment
In light of the above issues, a much ideal approach is to combine the merits from both hard-
ware and software platforms such that the users may examine the performance of Smart Grid ap-
plications under realistic communication and computation constraints in hardware platform, while
evaluating the corresponding scalability in software platform at the same time.
ScorePlus bridges the gaps between real hardware approach and software simulation ap-
proach. The key advantages of ScorePlus are:
• First, ScorePlus employs both software emulator and hardware testbed, which expose the
same and transparent interface to users. A Smart Grid application can be tested on either
of them without any modification. With this integration, researchers may examine the per-
formance of Smart Grid applications under realistic communication and computation con-
straints in hardware testbed, while evaluating the corresponding scalability in software em-
ulator at the same time.
• Second, the federated architecture of ScorePlus enables each distributed software emulator
or hardware testbed maintain its own autonomy and unique strengths, while all work together
to make their resources available under a unified framework. This plug-and-play architecture
greatly facilitates the scalability of distributed experiments.
• Finally, as far as we know, ScorePlus is the first Smart Grid experiment tool that has close
integration within cloud infrastructure. Leveraging the customized resource plugin mech-
anism of OpenStack cloud computing platform, the ScorePlus software are equipped with
high reusability to support massive deployment with large scale test cases.
ScorePlus also has its own limits: the power network model is static DC power flow model such
that we cannot use ScorePlus to capture transient physical dynamics, frequency control, power
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balance, and voltage regulations, etc. The strengths and limitations of our approach compared
with related works are listed in Table 2.1. The ScorePlus codes are open source released at https:
//sourceforge.net/projects/scorepluset/.
Table 2.1 Summary of features for related works and ScorePlus
Hardware testbed Software Simulation ScorePlus
Model fidelity High Low High
Accessibility Difficult Easy Easy
Scalability Low High High
Code migration Yes No Yes
Time step Real time Real time/discrete time Real time
Frequency control, Power balance Yes Yes No
Voltage regulations Yes Yes No
Cloud Infrastructure integration N/A N/A Yes
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CHAPTER 3
DATA INTEGRITY ATTACKS PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this chapter, we present the problem formulation of data integrity attacks, in which we
illustrate the attack model and reveal the intrinsic relations between data integrity attacks and real-
time electrical market operations.
3.1 Preliminaries and System model
3.1.1 State Estimation and Bad Data Detection
In state estimation process, the control center collects real time measurements z from the
deployed sensors and combines the network topology and parameter information to calculate the
real time estimates of the unknown system variables x. Mathematically [9], let x = (x1, x2, ..., xn)T
and z = (z1, z2, ..., zm)T denote state variables and meter measurements, respectively, where n is the
number of unknown state variables, m is the number of meters, and m ≥ n. The state variables are
related to the measurements by z = h(x) + e, where e is the Gaussian measurement noise with zero
mean and a covariance matrix σ2I. Under DC power flow model [9], the measurement model can
be represented as:
z = Hx + e (3.1)
where z is the bus power injection (power generation or load) and branch power flow measure-
ments, H is an m × n full rank Jacobian matrix of the measurement model and x is the voltage
phases at all buses. Then the estimated system states xˆ and branch power flows fˆ are given by:
xˆ = (HT H)−1HT z, fˆ = Fxˆ (3.2)
where F is the sensitivity matrix of branch flows with respect to the voltage phases. With DC power
flow model, since there also exists a linear bijection between nodal power injections and voltage
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phases [49], then given a reference bus, we would have a l-by-n injection shift factor matrix S to
denote the sensitivities of branch power flows with respect to the bus power injections [50], where
l is the number of branches. Assume z contains the injection measurements at all buses and flow
measurements across all the branches, denoted by zin and z f respectively, then we have:
z f = S · zin + e, fˆ = S · zin (3.3)
Bad data detector employs residual to detect the abnormalities in measurement data. From
(5.5),
zˆ = Hxˆ = Kz, where K = H(HT H)−1HT (3.4)
Then the measurement residual can be written as:
r = z − zˆ = (I − K)z (3.5)
The detector fires an alarm when ‖ r ‖2> threshold.
3.1.2 Real-Time Electrical Market
A combined two-stage (day-ahead and real-time) market is widely adopted by major U.S. In-
dependent System Operators (ISO) to stabilize the power system and calculate Locational Marginal
Prices (LMP) [51]. In the day-ahead market, given the projected system load levels L, the ISO ob-
tains the optimal generation dispatch P∗, the vector of predicted power generation at each bus.
Then P∗ are sent to all generators as generation reference, and day-ahead payments are collected
from customers at all buses.
In the real-time stage, the ISO obtains the actual system response through state estimation,
including the estimated power injections Pˆ, Lˆ and branch flows fˆ . Then the following linear pro-
gram [51] is solved to find the associated real-time LMP λ, a vector whose ith element λi is the
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LMP at bus i:
minimize
∆P, ∆L
∑
CGi ∆Pi −
∑
CLj ∆L j
s.t. (τ) :
∑
∆Pi =
∑
∆L j
∆Pmini ≤ ∆Pi ≤ ∆Pmaxi
(µb) :
∑
i
S bi∆Pi −
∑
j
S b j∆L j ≤ 0, for b ∈ Cˆ
(3.6)
where ∆P and ∆L are the vectors of incremental generation dispatch and load dispatch at buses,
with fixed cost CG,CL respectively. ∆Pmini ,∆P
max
i are predefined lower and upper bounds, usually
chosen as -2MW and 0.1MW in practice [51]. S bi is element at bth row, ith column of matrix S
in (3.3). Note that Cˆ is called congestion pattern [24], which denote the sets of branches whose
estimated power flow exceeds the flow limit f maxb ,
Cˆ = {b : fˆb > f maxb } (3.7)
Then by solving (3.6), the real-time LMP at bus i = 1, 2, ..., n, is calculated:
λi = τ −
∑
b∈Cˆ
S biµb (3.8)
where τ, µb are the corresponding dual variables in (3.6).
To clear the real-time market, the generator at bus i receives revenue λi(Pˆi − P∗i ), and the
customer at bus j pays λ j(Lˆ j − L j), where Pˆi and Lˆ j are the estimated power generation and load at
bus i and j from state estimation, respectively [51].
3.2 Problem Formulation
Suppose a malicious party wants to generate revenues from the real-time electrical market
by compromising a subset of meters ζA, such that only measurements from meters in ζA can be
modified. Note that the following strategies can also be applied to reducing customers’ payments.
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3.2.1 Constraints of Attacks
Firstly, since the attacker can only modify the measurements from meters in ζA, then the
perturbed measurements has to be in the form:
z˜ = z + a, a ∈ {a ∈ Rm|a = Ψc,∀c ∈ Rm} (3.9)
where a is the attack vector, and Ψ is the diagonal matrix:
Ψ = diag(ψ1, ..., ψm) (3.10)
where ψi is a binary variable and ψi = 1 iff meter i ∈ ζA.
Secondly, the attack should not be detected by the bad data detector. Based on (3.5), the new
residual becomes r˜ = r + (I − K)a. Based on triangular inequality,
‖ r˜ ‖2≤‖ r ‖2 + ‖ (I − K)a ‖2 (3.11)
Here we introduce a parameter ε, such that ‖ (I−K)a ‖22≤ ε. The smaller ε is chosen, the less likely
the attack will be detected. In the extreme case when ε = 0, the attack becomes unobservable [18].
3.2.2 Objective of Attacks
The objective of the attack is to maximize revenues from the real-time electrical market. From
the end of Section II (B), we can see that the generator at bus i receives revenue λi(Pˆi−P∗i ) in normal
situation. We analyze λi and Pˆi − P∗i separately.
First, from (3.6) and (3.8), it suggests that given a shift factor matrix S , the real-time LMP λ
depends only on the ISO’s congestion pattern observation [24], i.e, Cˆ. Meanwhile, since the ISO
determines Cˆ through the estimated branch flows fˆ as in (3.7), and fˆ are solely determined by the
power injection measurements within z˜ as in (3.3), therefore, we can see that z˜, fˆ , Cˆ and real-time
LMP λ form a Markov chain, such that given a tuple of (a, z, S ), there is a single corresponding λ.
In other words, the LMP λ is essentially a function of (a, z, S ). So from now on, we denote LMP
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as λ(a, z, S ). We abstract the complex routine of λ(a, z, S ) as a simulator, and the flow chart of the
simulator is shown in Figure 3.1.
Locational Marginal Price Simulator
Acquire flow estimate by (3.3), a,z,S
Solve (3.6), using S, C
Determine congestion 
pattern C by (3.7)
For i=1,2,…,n,
Acquire LMP λi by (3.8)
λ
Dual 
variables
f
C
f=Sz(in)=S(zin+ain)
~
Figure 3.1 Locational Marginal Price Simulator λ(a, z, S )
Second, since the estimated power generation in real-time stage should match the optimal
dispatch in day-ahead stage under normal situations [18] [19], then according to equation (3.4), for
each bus i,
Pˆi − P∗i = Ki(z + a) − P∗i = Kia (3.12)
where Ki is the corresponding row in matrix K to generation at bus i. Therefore, assume the
attacker wants to make revenues from generations at buses within a target set B. Then the total
revenue from attack vector a is:
V(a) =
∑
i∈B
λi(a, z, S )Kia (3.13)
3.2.3 Construct Attacks Against Real-Time Electrical Market
From all the above, the problem of constructing data integrity attacks against real-time elec-
trical market can be formulated as a simulation-based global optimization problem P1:
(P1): max
a
V(a) =
∑
i∈B
λi(a, z, S )Kia (3.14)
s.t. a = Ψc, ∀c ∈ Rm (3.15)
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‖ (I − K)a ‖22≤ ε (3.16)
3.2.4 Remarks
To solve P1, several facts are worth pointing out.
First, the objective function of P1 is based on complex simulator process in Figure 3.1. Only
function values are available and there is no algebraic model to analyze differentiability and Lips-
chitz condition. Therefore, derivative-free optimization methods have to be employed [52].
Second, as in (3.3) (3.4) (3.6) (3.11) (3.13), the attacker will need the following knowledge to
solve P1 accurately:
• 1) The meter measurement z.
• 2) The elements of matrix H, S and K.
The elements of matrix H, S and K depends on the detailed knowledge of network information,
including network topology and branch parameters, such as the exact position of circuit breaker
switches, transformer tap changers and power line admittances, etc. In fact, in any given power net-
work, the network information is huge and highly secured, and these information could be dynamic
since the topology can be reconfigured in both normal situations and contingencies. Therefore, it
is rather difficult for the attackers to achieve complete awareness of network information in prac-
tice. A good question would be whether it is possible to construct available attacks when network
information is not completely available.
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CHAPTER 4
ONLINE DATA INTEGRITY ATTACKS IN SMART GRID
4.1 Online Construction of Data Integrity Attacks without network information
In this section, we consider the strategy to construct data integrity attacks without network
information, in other words, when matrix H, S and K are unknown to the attacker. The measure-
ment z, the cost coefficient CG,CL, and flow limit f max are known to the attacker. By examining
P1, we can see that the attacker need to specifically deal with ‖ (I − K)a ‖22≤ ε in the constraint,
and λi(a, z, S ) and Kia in the objective.
4.1.1 Constraint ‖ (I − K)a ‖22≤ ε
The constraint ‖ (I − K)a ‖22≤ ε determines whether or not the attack can be detected by the
bad data detector. Since K is unknown, to safely launch an attack, the attacker would need to
consider the extreme case of constraint ‖ (I − K)a ‖22≤ ε, which is when ε = 0. In other words, if
we could construct a vector a which has ‖ (I − K)a ‖22= 0, then such an a would always satisfy the
constraint and the bad data detector can never detect it. Note from (3.4) that when a = Hv, ∀v ∈ Rn,
we always have ‖ (I − K)a ‖22= 0. This is the so called unobservable attack [18]. Therefore, to
satisfy the constraint, we just need to construct a vector a, which always lies in R(H), the column
space of matrix H. The last question would be how to determine R(H) when H is unknown and
even dynamic?
Inspired by [53], we can directly estimate and track the subspace R(H) using the measurement
z. Let zt denote the measurement vector at each time t, from (5.4):
zt = Hxt + et (4.1)
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To estimate R(H), at each time t, we aim at minimizing the following loss function,
Jt = arg min
J∈Rm×n
t∑
i=1
ρt−iui(J), (4.2)
where forgetting factor 0  ρ ≤ 1 controls the memory and tracking ability, J is the estimated
subspace with rank n since H is always full rank, and
ui(J) = min
x
‖ (zi − Jx) ‖22, i = 1, ..., t (4.3)
To solve (4.2), we alternate between the coefficient estimation and subspace update at each time t.
Specifically, the coefficient vector is estimated by:
xt = arg min
x
‖ (zt − Jt−1x) ‖22
= (JTt−1Jt−1)
−1JTt−1zt (4.4)
where J0 is a random initialization. Then Jt is solved from:
Jt = arg min
J
t∑
i=1
ρt−i ‖ (zi − Jxi) ‖22 (4.5)
where xi, i = 1, ..., t, are estimated from (4.4).
Note for all row h = 1, 2, ...,m, the objective function in (4.5) can be rowwise decomposed
[54] as Jt = [Jt1, J
t
2, ..., J
t
m]
T :
Jth = arg min
Jh
t∑
i=1
ρt−i(zi(h) − xTi Jh)2 (4.6)
= Jt−1h + (zt(h) − xTt Jt−1h )(W t)†xt
where W t = ρW t−1 + xtxTt and † means pseudoinverse. Equation (4.6) is the classical formulation
of Recursive Least Square (RLS) estimation with forgetting [55]. Based on RLS updating formula,
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we further have:
(W t)† = ρ−1(W t−1)† − (βt)−1αt(αt)T (4.7)
βt = 1 + ρ−1xTt (W
t−1)†xt, αt = ρ−1(W t−1)†xt (4.8)
We summarize the subspace estimation and tracking process for R(H) in Algorithm 5. At
Algorithm 1 Subspace Estimation and Tracking for R(H)
1: Input: A sequence of real-time measurements zt, t = 1, 2, ....
2: Initialize: An m × n random matrix J0, and a diagonal matrix (W0)† = δI, δ  0
3: for t=1,2,... do
4: xt = (JTt−1Jt−1)
−1JTt−1zt
5: βt = 1 + ρ−1xTt (W
t−1)†xt,
6: αt = ρ−1(W t−1)†xt
7: (W t)† = ρ−1(W t−1)† − (βt)−1αt(αt)T
8: for h=1,2,...,m, in parallel do
9: Jth = J
t−1
h + (zt(h) − xTt Jt−1h )(W t)†xt
10: Form Jt as Jt = [Jt1, J
t
2, ..., J
t
m]
T
each time t, the attacker acquires the current estimated subspace Jt from Algorithm 5. Then the
most conservative approach to replace the constraint ‖ (I − K)a ‖22≤ ε is:
a = Jt · η, ∀η ∈ Rn (4.9)
Note that this constraint can be further relaxed in section D.
4.1.2 Objective λ(a, z, S )
To calculate λ(a, z, S ), the attacker should figure out the unknown matrix S . Assume
z contains all the branch flow measurements and power injection measurements at all buses.
Based on (3.3), let l denote the number of branches, for a particular branch flow measurement
z f ( j), j = 1, 2, ..., l in z f , at each time t, we have:
ztf ( j) = (z
t
in)
T S tj + et (4.10)
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where S tj is the jth row of matrix S at time t. Therefore, we can also estimate S
t
j through RLS with
forgetting:
S tj = arg min
S j
t∑
i=1
ρt−i(zif ( j) − (ziin)T S j)2 (4.11)
= S t−1j + (z
t
f ( j) − (ztin)T S t−1j )(W t)†ztin
where W t = ρW t−1 + ztin(z
t
in)
T . Similar routines as in (4.7) (4.8) can be applied to find S tj. The
process of estimating S is summarized in Algorithm 2. S 0 is initialized as a random l × n matrix.
Therefore, to calculate λ(a, z, S ), at each time t, the attacker first get S t from Algorithm 2,
then invoke simulator λ(a, zt, S t) as in Figure 3.1.
Algorithm 2 Estimation for Shift Factor Matrix S
1: Input: Attack vector a, A sequence of real-time measurements zt, t = 1, 2, ....
2: Initialize: A diagonal matrix (W0)† = δI, δ  0
3: for t=1,2,... do
4: βt = 1 + ρ−1(ztin)
T (W t−1)†ztin,
5: αt = ρ−1(W t−1)†ztin
6: (W t)† = ρ−1(W t−1)† − (βt)−1αt(αt)T
7: for j=1,2,...,l, in parallel do
8: S tj = S
t−1
j + (z
t
f ( j) − (ztin)T S t−1j )(W t)†ztin
9: Form S t as S t = [S t1, S
t
2, ..., S
t
l]
T ;
4.1.3 Objective Kia
From (3.4), when H is unknown, K is unknown, so we cannot calculate Kia directly. However,
the following Lemma 1 shed some light on the method to tackle this problem.
Lemma 1 K in (3.4) is an orthogonal projector onto R(H).
Proof 1 Suppose b ∈ Rn, and let bˆ = Hxˆ be the orthogonal projection of b onto R(H). Then the
residual r = b − bˆ = b − Hxˆ is orthogonal to R(H), hence, it is orthogonal to each of the columns
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of H. As a result, we have:
HT (b − Hxˆ) = 0 =⇒ HT Hxˆ = HT b (4.12)
=⇒ xˆ = (HT H)−1HT b =⇒ Hxˆ = H(HT H)−1HT b
=⇒ bˆ = H(HT H)−1HT b = Kb
Therefore, K is an orthogonal projector onto R(H).
Based on Lemma 1, we present the following theorem to calculate Kia when K is unknown.
Theorem 1 Let matrix K = H(HT H)−1HT , where H ∈ Rm×n with full rank n. Suppose there is
another matrix J ∈ Rm×n also with full rank n, and R(J) = R(H). Define matrix K′ as:
K′ = J(JT J)−1JT (4.13)
,then K = K′.
Proof 2 Since R(J) = R(H), then:
∀x ∈ Rn, ∃y ∈ Rn, s.t. Hx = Jy. (4.14)
Based on Lemma 1, matrix K′ is also an orthogonal projector onto R(H). Therefore, for any
u ∈ Rm, we can have:
u = Ku + r, u = K′u + r′ (4.15)
where Ku,K′u ∈ R(H), and residual r, r′ are orthogonal to R(H). So,
(r − r′)T (Ku − K′u) = 0 (4.16)
Since r = u − Ku, r′ = u − K′u, we further have:
(K′u − Ku)T (Ku − K′u) = 0 (4.17)
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which means for any u ∈ Rm, we have Ku = K′u. Then the orthogonal projector must be unique
and K = K′.
Therefore, at each time t, the attacker can construct K′ = Jt(JTt Jt)
−1JTt using Jt generated from
Algorithm 5, then use K′i a to replace Kia in the objective.
4.1.4 Summary
Based on Theorem 1, instead of using equation (4.9), we can further replace constraint ‖
(I − K)a ‖22≤ ε with ‖ (I − K′)a ‖22≤ ε. Therefore, the problem of attack construction without
network information is formulated as P2:
(P2): max
a
V(a) =
∑
i∈B
λi(a, z, S )K′i ai (4.18)
s.t. a = Ψc, ∀c ∈ Rm (4.19)
‖ (I − K′)a ‖22≤ ε (4.20)
The attack construction process at each time t is summarized in Algorithm 3, where ν is a small
constant.
Algorithm 3 Online Construction Of Data Integrity Attacks Against Real-Time Electrical Market
1: Input: A sequence of real-time measurements zt, t = 1, 2, ....
2: Initialize: Launch Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2;
3: for t=1,2,... do
4: Get Jt from Algorithm 1 and S t from Algorithm 2;
5: if ‖ Jt − Jt−1 ‖F≤ ν and ‖ S t − S t−1 ‖F≤ ν then
6: Construct K′ = Jt(JTt Jt)
−1JTt , update P2 objective;
7: Update the constraint ‖ (I − K′)a ‖22≤ ε in P2;
8: Solving P2 using derivative-free optimization method. (In search process, evaluations of
objective function invoke simulator routine λ(a, zt, S t));
9: Based on solved vector a, modify the measurements of corresponding meters in ζA;
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4.2 Countermeasure
In this section, we present the online defense strategy against the previously proposed attack.
The defense strategy consists of two components: the attack detection component and the attack
identification component. The detection component is responsible for indicating the existence of
the attacks, and the identification component will be invoked afterwards to further identify the set
of malicious meters. Only the real-time data streams of meter measurements are needed and no
extra meter hardware investment is required.
4.2.1 Attack Detection
From the perspective of system operators, since the network topology and parameter informa-
tion are highly secure in control center [9], they are the trustworthy baseline that can be employed
to detect attacks. Note the shift factor matrix only depends on the network topology and parameter
info, such that the matrix known to the system operator should be accurate at all times. We denote
the true shift factor matrix as S true. Meanwhile, as shown in Algorithm 2, the shift matrix can also
be derived from the power flow measurements. Therefore, to detect the attack, the system operator
could derive a corresponding shift factor matrix S˜ from a series of collected measurements z˜, then
a discrepancy between the derived shift factor matrix S˜ and the S true at hand will trigger an alarm
to indicate the attack.
Specifically, suppose the control center collects a series of real time measurements z˜, which
could be the manipulated measurements. Similarly as in (4.10), let l denote the number of branches,
for a particular branch flow measurement z˜ f ( j), j = 1, 2, ..., l in z˜ f , at each time t, we have:
z˜tf ( j) = (z˜
t
in)
T S˜ tj + et (4.21)
where S˜ tj is the jth row of matrix S˜ at time t. As a result, we can also estimate S˜
t
j iteratively
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through RLS with forgetting:
S˜ tj = arg min
S˜ j
t∑
i=1
ρt−i(z˜if ( j) − (z˜iin)T S˜ j)2 (4.22)
= S˜ t−1j + (z˜
t
f ( j) − (z˜tin)T S˜ t−1j )(W t)†z˜tin
Note W t = ρW t−1 + z˜tin(z˜
t
in)
T , and its pseudoinverse can be recursively updated as:
(W t)† = ρ−1(W t−1)† − (βt)−1αt(αt)T (4.23)
where
βt = 1 + ρ−1(z˜tin)
T (W t−1)†z˜tin, α
t = ρ−1(W t−1)†z˜tin (4.24)
Then derived shift factor matrix at time t can be formed as: S˜ t = [S˜ t1, S˜
t
2, ..., S˜
t
l]
T .
After S˜ is derived, the discrepancy can be calculated as:
γ =
‖S true − S˜ ‖F
‖S true‖F (4.25)
Then if the discrepancy γ is greater than a tuned threshold κ, an alarm would be triggered and the
attack identification process will be invoked.
4.2.2 Attack Identification
To further identify which measurements have been manipulated, suppose the control center
collects a series of N real time measurements at continuous time stamps z˜t, t = 1, 2, 3...,N and
construct a m-by-N matrix Z˜ by columnwise stacking these measurement vectors together. From
(3.9), we have:
Z˜ = Z + A (4.26)
where Z = [z1, z2, ..., zN] is the matrix containing normal measurements and A = [a1, a2, ..., aN] is
the matrix containing all the attack vectors. It is known that power system measurements change
gradually in continuous time interval [56], rendering Z typically low rank. Meanwhile, since the
27
attacker usually can only modify a limited number of meter measurements, such that matrix A
tends to be sparse [57]. Therefore, the normal measurements and attack vectors can be recovered
from:
(P3): min
Z,A
‖ Z ‖∗ +ω ‖ A ‖1 s.t. Z˜ = Z + A (4.27)
where ‖ · ‖∗ denotes the nuclear norm, ω is a regularization parameter. The problem P3 is the
well known sparse and low-rank matrix decomposition problem [58]. As long as we can recover
sparse matrix A, then based on its rows that contain nonzero elements, we can identify which mea-
surements have been attacked. As suggested by [59], P3 can be solved by employing Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) algorithm. The Lagrangian function of P3 is:
L(Z, A,Q, µ) =‖ Z ‖∗ +ω ‖ A ‖1 +〈Q, Z˜ − Z − A〉
+
µ
2
‖ Z˜ − Z − A ‖22 (4.28)
where µ is positive number, Q is the Lagrangian multipliers, and 〈·〉 denotes the Frobenius matrix
product. For each iteration k = 1, 2, 3, ... until convergence, Z is firstly updated as:
Zk+1 = UP 1
µ
{D}VT (4.29)
where U,D,VT are the singular value decomposition of matrix (Z˜ − Ak + 1µQk), and the operator
Pa{b} is an elementwise applied soft thresholding function defined as:
Pa{b} = sign(b) ·max{|b| − a, 0} (4.30)
Secondly, A is updated as:
Ak+1 = Pωµ {Z˜ − Zk+1 +
1
µ
Qk} (4.31)
Finally, the Lagrangian multiplier Q is updated as:
Qk+1 = Qk + µ(Z˜ − Zk+1 − Ak+1) (4.32)
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4.2.3 Summary
From the above all, the procedure of online defense against data integrity attacks is illustrated
in Figure 4.1. The attack detection process is monitoring the system using real-time measurement
data stream all the time. Once an attack is detected, the attack identification process is launched to
identify the potential malicious set of meters ζA. Then the measurements from meter set ζA will be
removed from the measurement data stream used by the attack detection process. This procedure
iterates until there is no attack indicated by the attack detection process. Algorithm 4 presents the
Data stream 
from meter set 
M
(Discrepancy > threshold)
Yes
No
M is the set of all 
meters
M=M \ 
Attack Identification
(calculate     )
Attack Detection
(calculate   )
Figure 4.1 Flow Chart of Iterative Online Defense Process
implementation details. S˜ 0 is initialized as a random l×n matrix, and κ is a tuned constant. N is the
measurement buffer size, which determines how soon the system is able to identify the malicious
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set of meters after an attack is detected.
Algorithm 4 Online Defense of Data Integrity Attacks Against Real-Time Electrical Market
1: M is the set of all measurement meters.
2: Input: A sequence of real-time measurements z˜t, t = 1, 2, ... from meter set M.
3: Initialize: A diagonal matrix (W0)† = δI, δ  0, k = 0.
4: for t=1,2,... do
5: βt = 1 + ρ−1(z˜tin)
T (W t−1)†z˜tin,
6: αt = ρ−1(W t−1)†z˜tin
7: (W t)† = ρ−1(W t−1)† − (βt)−1αt(αt)T
8: for j=1,2,...,l, in parallel do
9: S˜ tj = S˜
t−1
j + (z˜
t
f ( j) − (z˜tin)T S˜ t−1j )(W t)†z˜tin
10: Form S˜ t as S˜ t = [S˜ t1, S˜
t
2, ..., S˜
t
l]
T ;
11: if ‖S˜ t−S˜ t−1‖F‖S˜ t−1‖F ≤ ν then
12: Calculate γ = ‖S true−S˜ t‖F‖S true‖F
13: if γ > κ then
14: (Concurrently start a separate and independent identification process as following.)
15: Formulate matrix Z˜ by columnwise stacking most recent N measurements;
16: Initialize Z0 = 0, Q0 = 0, µ = m·N4·‖Z˜‖1 , and ω =
1√
max(m,N)
17: while not converged do
18: Update Zk+1 as in (4.29);
19: Update Ak+1 as in (4.31);
20: Update Qk+1 as in (4.32);
21: k=k+1;
22: Based on the rows containing nonzero elements of recovered matrix A, assign the cor-
responding meters to the malicious set ζA.
23: Update set M as M = M \ ζA.
24: Go to step 2.
4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our proposed attacking strategies through IEEE bus benchmark
system [60] with both synthetic data and real load data streams from the New York Independent
System Operator [61]. All the numerical simulations are conducted in Matlab platform with soft-
ware packages including @MATPOWER and patternsearch solver in Global Optimization Tool-
box.
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4.3.1 Attack when network info is known
In this part, we examine the performance of P1 through IEEE14 bus system (14 buses and 20
branches), in which the network information is known. In this case, we use the synthetic load data
that comes with MATPOWER. All power injection measurements and power flow measurements
(in both directions for each line) are employed, such that m = 54, n = 14. We first examine
the functionality of LMP simulator. Since the LMP at all buses totally depend on the congestion
pattern, we directly plot the LMP under different congestion patterns in Figure 4.2. The congestion
pattern includes the ID of branches whose power flows exceed the security limits. One interesting
fact is that different congestion patterns could result in the same LMP at a particular bus, e.g, the
LMP at bus 4 are the same in the last two congestion patterns, both of which have branch 7, 9
congested, and are incident with bus 4.
Table 4.1 Optimal attack vector a against IEEE14 with different sizes of ζA
size of ζA optimal attack vector a
2 (0,63.0),(2,34.4)
4 (0,65.1),(2,32.0),(14,48.5),(34,-64.0)
6 (0,69.3),(2,32.0),(3,-48.0),(14,-48.0),(15,32.0),(34,-64.0)
8 (0,79.0),(2,32.0),(3,-32.0),(4,-48.0),(5,32.0),(14,52.3),(15,32.0),(34,-64.0)
10 (0,103.0),(2,32.0),(3,-48.0),(4,-64.0),(5,32.0),(14,68.0),(15,34.0),(17,32.0),
(34,-64.0),(35,-33.0)
Then we demonstrate the optimal attack vectors in P1 when different number of meters are com-
promised. Table 6.2 lists the optimal attack vector a against IEEE14 system under different size
of ζA. The notation (p, q) denotes the nonzero entries of vector a, and p is the index and q is the
value. The corresponding maximum revenues under optimal attack vectors are given in Figure 4.3.
We can see that the number of compromised meters has a significant impact on the revenues.
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4.3.2 Online attack construction: when network info is unknown
In this part, we examine the performance of P2, in which the network information is unknown.
Both IEEE14 bus and IEEE118 bus system are employed.
Data preparation For IEEE14 bus system, we incorporate the real-time load data streams
from the New York independent system operator (NYISO) during a 48 hour period (10/01-10/02) in
2015. In NYISO, there are 11 load regions (CAPITL, CENTRL, DUNWOD, GENESE, HUDVL,
LONGIL, MHKVL, MILLWD, NYC, NORTH, WEST). The load data are recorded for each region
every 5 minutes. Therefore, for each region, there are load data at 12 × 48 = 576 continues time
instances. Meanwhile, since there are exactly 11 load buses with IEEE14 bus system, the NYISO
load data at each region can be directly mapped to each load bus in IEEE14 and generate 576
corresponding real-time measurements zt, t = {1, 2, ..., 576}. Specifically, the following procedures
are performed [62]:
• Map each load bus of IEEE14 bus system with one region of NYISO based on Table 4.2.
• Calculate ratio of the total loads from NYISO to the total loads of original IEEE14 buses
system. Then divide each NYISO region load by the ratio and assign the resulted load to
each load bus within IEEE14. The generation capacity in IEEE14 is not changed.
• Solve the system state xt using power flow calculations based on the new loads and generate
corresponding measurement zt by the IEEE14 model.
Table 4.2 Mapping between NYISO Regions and IEEE14 Buses
Region Name CAPITL CENTRL DUNWOD GENESE HUDVL LONGIL MHKVL MILLWD NYC NORTH WEST
IEEE14 Bus No. 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14
For IEEE118 system, we leverage synthetic data generated from Monte Carlo simulation. In
each Monte Carlo run, we use nonlinear state estimation model to generate measurement vector
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at each time instance. State vectors at different time instances are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed Gaussian random vectors with the mean equal to the operating states given
in 118 bus data sheet.
Performance of Algorithm 1 and 2 To evaluate Algorithm 1 and 2, we use normalized
errors to examine the performance of estimations for subspace R(H), matrix K, and S , which are
defined as ‖(I−Jt ·J
′
t )H‖F
‖H‖F ,
‖K′−K‖F
‖K‖F , and
‖S t−S ‖F
‖S ‖F , respectively. Meanwhile, to evaluate the performance
of proposed algorithms in dynamic topology scenarios: For IEEE14 system, we disconnect bus 4
and bus 5 at time instance 200, and reconnect them at time instance 400. For IEEE118 system,
we disconnect bus 15 and bus 33 at time instance 200, and reconnect them at time instance 400.
Figure 4.4-4.11 show the normalized errors as the time goes in both cases. We can see that the
algorithms are more sensitive to the topology changes in a smaller size of power system, in which
the peak error will be larger but can be reduced more quickly.
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Figure 4.4 Subspace and matrix K estimation error in IEEE14 system
Performance of Algorithm 3 We evaluate the performance of Algorithm 3 from the per-
spective of attackers to see how much revenue can be generated. Since there will be errors in the
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Figure 4.5 Shift factor S estimation error in IEEE14 system
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Figure 4.6 Subspace and matrix K estimation error in IEEE14 system with dynamic topology
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Figure 4.7 Shift factor S estimation error in IEEE14 system with dynamic topology
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Figure 4.8 Subspace and matrix K estimation error in IEEE118 system
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Figure 4.9 Shift factor S estimation error in IEEE118 system
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Figure 4.11 Shift factor S estimation error in IEEE118 system with dynamic topology
constructions of R(H), matrix K, and S , the bad data alarm is likely to be fired when the optimal
attack vector from P2 is applied. Therefore, from the attacker’s point of view, choosing the value of
parameter ε in P2 would be critical. In IEEE14 system, the 0.05 significant-level bad data detector
employs a chi-square distribution threshold = χ2m−n,0.95 = χ
2
54−14,0.95. We present the corresponding
real-time revenues under different ε in Figure 4.12 and 4.13 by employing the real load data from
NYISO. The size of ζA is 10. In both cases, we plot the maximum revenues with known network
information as a reference. When the network information is unknown, we can see that the rev-
enues curve will start at a time point around 50 instead of 0. This is because in Algorithm 3, the
normalized error of R(H), matrix K, and S can only become less than ν = 0.01 until it collects
certain amount of measurements. More importantly, the revenue curve is not continuous. The
missing points in the curve are the time instances when the bad data alarm is fired due to the attack
vector from P2. In that case, no revenue can be generated by the attacker. It can be seen that when
ε is reduced from threshold/2, more time instances can generate revenues but the value of revenue
is decreased correspondingly.
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Figure 4.12 Real-time revenues with ε = threshold in IEEE14
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Figure 4.13 Real-time revenues with ε = threshold/2 in IEEE14
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4.3.3 Countermeasure
In this subsection, we present the evaluation of countermeasure, which consists of both attack
detection and attack identification in Algorithm 4.
Attack detection For the attack detection, corresponding to the two attack scenarios in
Figure 4.12 and 4.13, we plot the resulted detection value γ when using both normal measurements
and corrupted measurements in Figure 4.14 and 4.15. We can see that when the attack starts
to generate revenue and cause data corruption, there would be a significant increase in value γ
compared to its value in normal case. Therefore, using value γ can effectively indicate the existence
of attacks.
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Figure 4.14 Attack detection with ε = threshold in IEEE14
Attack identification To evaluate the performance of attack identification, we examine true
positive rates and false alarm rates of malicious meter identification when different measurement
buffer size N are employed. The measurement buffer size N determines how quickly the system
would begin to identify the malicious meter sets after an attack is detected. From Figure 4.16, we
can see that the buffer size N neither can be too small nor too large, which would result in either a
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Figure 4.15 Attack detection with ε = threshold/2 in IEEE14
high false alarm rate or a poor true positive rate. A good trade off would be 96 in this case, where
the formulated matrix Z˜ have slightly more columns than rows.
4.3.4 Online Computational Performance
The algorithm 1, 2, 3, and 4 are computationally intensive. Since the real time measurements
are usually published every few minutes (5 minutes in PJM), our algorithms should be fast and
responsive enough to adapt to the data generation speed. We evaluate the these algorithms within
in Matlab 2013, on our testing machine (64 bits HP desktop with Inter(R) Core(TM) i7-5500
CPU@2.40GHz and 8GB memory). The cputime function in Matlab is employed to track the ex-
ecution time. When receiving a new measurement vector z, the average time needed (seconds) to
estimate R(H) (Algorithm 1), estimate shift factor matrix S (Algorithm 2), calculate attack vec-
tor a (Algorithm 3), and detect and identify corresponding attack vector a (Algorithm 4), in both
IEEE14 and IEEE118 bus systems, are listed in Table 4.3. From the table, we can see that due to
the application of derivative-free optimization solver, the computation time increases significantly
as the size of power network increases. However, in case IEEE118, Algorithm 3 is still respon-
sive enough to generate the attack vector in real time. Moreover, since Algorithm 4 requires the
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Figure 4.16 Attack identification with different measurement buffer size
buffering of several measurements before starting, it would be able to meet the online operation
requirement.
Table 4.3 Computational Time of Algorithms 1-4 in Seconds
Case Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2 Algorithm 3 Algorithm 4
IEEE14 bus 0.0013 1.8989e-04 17.7542 33.4870
IEEE118 bus 0.0102 0.0027 101.546 219.772
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we present online data integrity attacks against real-time electrical market.
The online attack construction strategy is proposed when the attacker has no knowledge of power
network information and our results show that the attacker could generate a fair amount of revenues
through data integrity attacks. A corresponding online countermeasure is also presented to detect
and identify the attacks.
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CHAPTER 5
LPATTACK: LEVERAGE-POINT BASED DATA INTEGRITY ATTACKS IN SMART
GRID
In this chapter, we present a novel class of malicious data attacks against Smart Grid state
estimation, called LPAttack. Here LP represents leverage points, which are the outliers in the factor
space of the regression model for state estimation [63]. Different from the previous works, we
present a brand new approach to launching undetectable data attacks by strategically manipulating
the network parameter data, such that leverage points are created within the factor space of the
state estimation regression model. The key feature about leverage point is that the residual of the
measurement corresponded with a leverage point will be very small even when it is contaminated
with a very large error [63]. Based on this key feature, the attacker can freely introduce arbitrary
errors into the corresponding meter measurements while without being detected by the existing
bad data detection mechanism. Meanwhile, the existing leverage points can also be determined,
such that the most vulnerable meters can be directly identified. The concept of leverage point is
not new in power system state estimation, however, as far as we know, we are the first to explore
the potentials of cyber attacks employing this feature. Our key contributions are:
• We present and rigorously prove the validity of the fundamental principles and strategies for
launching LPAttack.
• We propose a potential countermeasure against LPAttack based on robust Schweppe-Huber
Generalized-M estimator.
• We evaluate the LPAttack principles and countermeasure in IEEE test system, and examine
in particular the effect of attacks on Locational Marginal Prices in real-time electrical market.
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5.1 State Estimation and Bad Data Detection In Detail
State estimation: Figure 5.1 demonstrates the typical state estimation process in control
center. State estimation takes three kinds of data as input:
• z: The meter measurement data, including power injections of buses and power flows of
branches within power system.
• t: The network topology data, indicating the on and off status of various power network
switches and circuit breakers between buses.
• p: The parameter data, typically including: 1) the branch susceptance data and 2) the vari-
ances of meter measurement errors, etc.
Typically, z, t and p are either telemetered data that are sent wirely/wirelessly from meters and
sensors to control center, or kept in databases within data center.
After taking the input, the topology processing and observability analysis process would gen-
erate the regression model equation, in which:
• 1) The matrix H depends on the topology data t and the branch susceptance data in p;
• 2) The variances of each meter measurement error ei in vector e, denoted by σ2i , are part of
data in p.
Then the weighted least-square state estimator is used to solve the equation to get the best estimates
of the unknown state variables x, which are the voltage magnitude and phase angle at each bus.
Mathematically, a precise definition of state estimation is given as follows [9]. Let x =
(x1, x2, ..., xn)T and z = (z1, z2, ..., zm)T denote state variables and meter measurements, respectively,
where n is the number of unknown state variables, m is the number of meter measurements, and
m ≥ n. Further let e = (e1, e2, ..., em)T denote meter measurement errors, which are assumed to be
normally distributed with zero mean. The state variables are related to the measurements by:
z = h(x) + e (5.1)
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Figure 5.1 State estimation process in control center
where h(x) = (h1(x1, x2, ..., xn), ..., hm(x1, x2, ..., xn))T , and E(e) = 0 and cov(e) = W, and W is
defined as:
W =

σ−21 0 · · · 0
0 σ−22 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · σ−2m

(5.2)
where σ2i is the variances of ei.
The state estimation problem is formulated as the following Weighted Least Square (WLS)
format:
minimize
x
1
2
rT Wr
subject to z = h(x) + r
(5.3)
For state estimation using standard DC power flow model [9], the Equation (5.1) can be
represented by a linear regression model:
z = Hx + e (5.4)
where H is an m × n full rank Jacobian matrix of the measurement model. Then the WLS state
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estimator will give the following solution:
xˆ = (HT WH)−1HT Wz (5.5)
Bad data detection: Measurement residuals are employed by the bad data detection techniques in
Smart Grid to protect state estimation process against abnormality in measurement data, which are
usually caused by nature or faulty sensors. The measurement residual is represented as:
r = z − zˆ = z − Hxˆ (5.6)
The objective function for bad data detection is defined as follows [9]:
J(xˆ) =
m∑
i=1
(zi − Hi xˆ)2
σ2i
=
m∑
i=1
r2i
σ2i
(5.7)
where Hi is the ith row of H. Then in the J(xˆ) test:
J(xˆ) =

Bad data , if J(xˆ) > ε
Good data , if J(xˆ) ≤ ε
where ε is an empirical detection threshold defined in control center. If no bad data is detected, the
state estimation resulted xˆ would be accepted by the subsequent control processes. Otherwise, an
alarm is fired and new data must be incorporated to start over the whole process.
5.2 LPAttack: Leverage-Point Based Attacks
We assume that the attackers can access and manipulate the data z, t, and p as needed to
launch the attacks.
Let z¯ = W
1
2 · z, r¯ = W 12 · r, H¯ = W 12 · H and e¯ = W 12 · e, from (5.4):
z¯ = H¯ · x + e¯ (5.8)
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where E[e¯] = 0 and cov[e¯] = Im. Then the WLS solution for x in (5.5) can be rewritten as:
xˆ = (H¯T H¯)−1H¯T z¯ (5.9)
and the residual,
r¯ = z¯ − H¯ xˆ = (Im − K)z¯ (5.10)
where Im is the m dimensional identity matrix and K is the well known hat matrix[64], defined as:
K = H¯(H¯T H¯)−1H¯T (5.11)
Since K is both symmetric (K = KT ) and idempotent (K ·K = K), then Kii can also be written
as:
Kii = K2ii +
m∑
j=1, j,i
K2i j (5.12)
It follows from the above equation that 0 ≤ Kii ≤ 1.
5.2.1 Principles of LPAttack
In the above regression model, the row vector H¯i = (H¯i1, H¯i2, ..., H¯in) defines a factor point in
the n dimensional factor space of the regression. The outliers which are far away from the bulk of
the factor points in this space are called leverage points and the corresponding measurements are
called leverage measurements [63]. Geometrically, Kii gives a measure of the distance from the
factor point H¯i to the bulk of the remaining (m − 1) factor points. If Kii is close to 1.0, it will be
likely to behave as a leverage point.
r = z − zˆ = (I − K)z (5.13)
A large value of Kii will imply that there is a strong influence of the ith measurement zi on
its estimated zˆi, such that the estimated value is essentially determined by its measured value [9].
Thus we call the value of Kii as the leverage of measurement zi. As we can see from (5.10) and
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(5.12), as Kii becomes closer to 1, the residual ri would be very small, no matter how much error
is introduced into measurement zi. Since the bad data detection process depends solely on the
measurement residual, it would fail to reject the measurement data even when it is contaminated
with a very large error. In other words, the larger the attackers can increase the value of Kii,
the less likely the perturbation of measurement zi can be detected by the bad data detection
process. This is the key idea of leverage-point attacks. Theorem 1 gives the general relationship
between any set of measurements z and the values of Kii when it can pass the J(xˆ) test.
Theorem 2 Let ε be the threshold and σi=1,...,m be the variances of errors in the J(xˆ) test. Given
any set of measurements z, it is guaranteed to pass the J(xˆ) test when
∑m
i=1(1−Kii)
∑m
j=1(z
2
j/σ
2
j) ≤ ε.
Proof 3 From (5.10), we have,
r¯i = (
m∑
j=1, j,i
−Ki jz¯ j) + (1 − Kii)z¯i (5.14)
From Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (5.12),
r¯i2 = ((
m∑
j=1, j,i
−Ki jz¯ j) + (1 − Kii)z¯i)2
≤ [
m∑
j=1, j,i
K2i j + (1 − Kii)2][
m∑
j=1
z¯2j]
= [Kii − K2ii + (1 − Kii)2][
m∑
j=1
z¯2j]
= (1 − Kii)[
m∑
j=1
z¯2j]
Since r¯i = ri/σi and z¯i = zi/σi, then based on J(xˆ) test definition, we get:
m∑
i=1
(1 − Kii)
m∑
j=1
(z2j/σ
2
j) ≤ ε (5.15)
Theorem 2 suggests a basic requirement for the attacker to launch a successful attack. From a
pragmatic point of view, it is more worth investigating how the perturbation of a particular mea-
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surement zi, can be marked by the only change of Kii.
Theorem 3 Suppose the original set of measurements z can bypass the J(xˆ) test. When one mea-
surement zi in z is perturbed into z′i by the attacker, the new measurement set z
′ is guaranteed to
bypass the J(xˆ) test if the attacker can change the original Kii to K′ii, which satisfies:
K′ii ≥ Kii +
∑m
j=1(1 − K j j)(z′i 2 − z2i )/σ2i∑m
j=1, j,i(z2j/σ
2
j) + z
′
i
2/σ2i
(5.16)
Proof 4 Since the original z can pass the bad data detection process, from Theorem 1, we have,
m∑
i=1
(1 − Kii)
m∑
j=1
(z2j/σ
2
j) ≤ ε (5.17)
In order to mark the perturbation of measurement zi to z′i by only changing Kii to K
′
ii, it must also
satisfy,
[(
m∑
j=1
1 − K j j) + Kii − K′ii][(
m∑
j=1
z2j
σ2j
) +
(z′i
2 − z2i )
σ2i
] ≤ ε (5.18)
Compared with (5.17), we have:
(Kii − K′ii)[(
m∑
j=1
z2j
σ2j
) +
(z′i
2 − z2i )
σ2i
] ≤ −
m∑
j=1
(1 − K j j) (z
′
i
2 − z2i )
σ2i
(5.19)
which is equivalent to:
K′ii ≥ Kii +
∑m
j=1(1 − K j j)(z′i 2 − z2i )/σ2i∑m
j=1, j,i(z2j/σ
2
j) + z
′
i
2/σ2i
(5.20)
Theorem 3 demonstrates how much the attacker has to increase the value Kii after the perturbation
of a single measurement zi. Note that in cases when the attacker wants to perturb multiple mea-
surements, the attack can be conducted in a sequential manner and Theorem 2 is applied repeatedly
in each step with the most updated Kii and z. Also, since the maximum value of Kii is 1, so when
the calculated results indicate a required value which is greater than 1, that means only changing
Kii cannot mark the perturbation of zi, and several other values of K j j, j = 1, ...,m, j , i should
also be increased in order to meet Theorem 1.
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One last question for the attacker would be how to actually increase the value of Kii. The
following theorem gives the answer.
Theorem 4 Let Kii be the ith diagonal element of hat matrix K defined in (5.11), then,
(1 − Kii)2 ≤
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww

H¯p
H¯ f

wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
2
2
‖ H¯Ti ‖22
where H¯i is the ith row of H¯, and H¯ is partitioned as:
H¯ =

H¯p
H¯i
H¯ f

Proof 5 Since K is both symmetric (K = KT ) and idempotent (K ·K = K), then K is the orthogonal
projector for col(H¯), which is the column space of H¯. For any vector v, the projection of v gives
the closest vector in col(H¯) to v, where closest is measured in Euclidean norm. That is,
‖ v − Kv ‖22 ≤ ‖ v − u ‖22 (5.21)
for all u ∈ col(H¯).
Let yˆ = Kei be the projection of ei on the col(H¯), where ei is the m dimensional vector with
ith element equals to 1 and all the other elements are zeros. Then there exists a vector tˆ such that
yˆ = H¯tˆ =

H¯ptˆ
H¯itˆ
H¯ f tˆ

(5.22)
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Note that yˆ is the closest vector to ei in col(H¯). That is, for any t,
‖ ei − H¯tˆ ‖22 ≤ ‖ ei − H¯t ‖22 (5.23)
or equivalently,
‖ H¯ptˆ ‖22 + ‖ H¯ f tˆ ‖22 + (1 − H¯itˆ)2 ≤
‖ H¯pt ‖22 + ‖ H¯ f t ‖22 + (1 − H¯it)2
(5.24)
Note that since yˆ = Kei, then with (5.22), we get H¯itˆ = Kii. Also set t = H¯Ti /‖ H¯Ti ‖22, then
(1 − H¯it)2 = 0. So from (5.24),
(1 − Kii)2 ≤ ‖ H¯pt ‖22 + ‖ H¯ f t ‖22 − ‖ H¯ptˆ ‖22 − ‖ H¯ f tˆ ‖22
≤ ‖ H¯pH¯
T
i ‖22
‖ H¯Ti ‖42
+
‖ H¯ f H¯Ti ‖22
‖ H¯Ti ‖42
=
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww

H¯p
H¯ f
 H¯Ti
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
2
2
‖ H¯Ti ‖42
≤
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww

H¯p
H¯ f

wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
2
2
‖ H¯Ti ‖22
‖ H¯Ti ‖42
=
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww

H¯p
H¯ f

wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
2
2
‖ H¯Ti ‖22
From Theorem 4, it can be seen that the attacker can increase the value of Kii by just increasing the
l2-norm of H¯Ti . Since H¯i = 1/σi · Hi, then mathematically it gives three rules to increase the value
of Kii:
• Rule 1: Increase the absolute values of elements in Hi.
• Rule 2: Decrease the value of σi.
• Rule 3: Increase the number of non-zero elements in Hi.
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5.2.2 Attacking Strategies in Smart Grid
In this part, we introduce the specific attacking strategies against the measurements in Smart
Grid by applying the above principles.
Attacking Power Flow Measurement As shown in Figure 5.2, power flow measurement is
the one placed between buses to monitor the power flow across the connecting branch. If an entry
zi of z is the measurement of the power flow from bus k to m, then zi = Bkm(xk − xm), where Bkm
is the branch susceptance between bus k and m and xk, xm are the unknown voltage phase angles at
bus k and m. The corresponding ith row of H is:
Hi = [0, ...,
kth entry︸    ︷︷    ︸
Bkm , 0, ..., 0,
mth entry︸     ︷︷     ︸
−Bkm , ..., 0] (5.25)
If the attacker intends to alter the measurement from zi to z′i without being detected, he should
Power flow meter
bus k bus m
zi
Bkm σi
Figure 5.2 Power flow measurement
apply Theorem 3 first to figure out how much he has to increase the value of Kii, then applies rule
1 and rule 2, which requires increasing the value of Bkm and decreasing the value of σi.
Attacking Power Injection Measurement As shown in Figure 5.3, power injection mea-
surement is placed at bus to monitor the power injection of the particular bus, typically from a load
or synchronized generator. If zi is the measurement of power injection at bus i, it is the sum of
all the power flows along incident branches to that bus: zi =
∑
j∈Ni zi j, where Ni is the set of buses
incident to i, e.g. , k,m ∈ Ni. Therefore, the corresponding ith row of H is the sum of all the row
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vectors corresponding to the incident branch power flows, which is:
Hi = [0, ...,
ith entry︸   ︷︷   ︸∑
j∈Ni
Bi j , ...,
kth entry︸    ︷︷    ︸
−Bik , ...,
mth entry︸     ︷︷     ︸
−Bim , ..., 0] (5.26)
If the attacker intends to alter the measurement from zi to z′i without being detected, he applies
bus i
zi
Bim
σi
Power injection 
meter
..
.
bus k
bus m
Bik
Figure 5.3 Attacking power injection measurement
Theorem 3 first to figure out how much he has to increase the value of Kii, then he can apply
rule 1 and rule 2 in this case. In addition, since the number of nonzero elements is related to the
physical connections of buses in power network, rule 3 cannot be applied directly. However, it is
still valuable since it suggests that the power injection measurements at buses with more incident
branches are more vulnerable since they already have a large leverage in normal condition.
5.2.3 Remarks
Several facts are worth pointing out from the above analysis.
• First, since σi is the standard deviation of measurement error ei, a smaller σi indicates a
higher accuracy of the measurement zi. This implies that high accuracy measurement is
more likely to become a leverage point and attacking a higher accuracy device will actually
have better chance of success.
• Second, increasing the susceptance of branches should be the first choice of the attacker
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since it can affect the branch flow measurement and the power injection measurements at
incident buses simultaneously.
• Third, the existences of leverage points in actual power system are very common. For in-
stance, the IEEE 118-bus system has 7.2% of branches with relatively large susceptance(13
over 179) and 28% of buses with at least 4 incident branches (33 over 118) [63]. This sug-
gests that even without the explicit creations of leverage points, the attacker can still launch
LPAttack against the corresponding measurements.
• Finally, even though the above attacking rules and strategies are analyzed from the pure
mathematical perspectives, they are exactly coincident with the actual leverage point situa-
tions [9] in power system, which includes: injection measurement placed at a bus which is
incident to branches with large susceptance value (apply rule 1 to injection measurement);
flow measurement along branches with very large susceptance value (apply rule 1 to flow
measurement); Using a very large weight for a specific measurement (applying rule 2 to
both flow and injection measurement);injection measurements placed at a buses which are
incident to a large number of branches (applying rule 3 to injection measurement).
5.3 Countermeasure
We propose the countermeasure strategy based on robust state estimator that does not re-
quire any investments of securing hardware devices. Since all the attacking strategies are based
on the creation of leverage points, the straightforward countermeasure would be first evaluating
the leverages of measurements to identify the leverage points, then discards the corresponding
measurements before entering WLS state estimator. However, since the ubiquitous existence of
leverage points in power system and the leverage measurements could be good when there is no
cyber attacks, the above approach would destroy a large amount of useful information and could
even make the system unobservable. Therefore, a better solution should be replacing the WLS
with a more robust state estimator, which is designed to automatically detect the leverage points
and suppress the influence of the corresponding measurements on the state estimation.
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Inspired by the works in [65] [66], we present the countermeasure based on the robust
Schweppe-Huber Generalized-M (SHGM) estimator. We modified SHGM such that it possesses
good robustness and efficiency against LPAttack. ωi is specifically designed as the penalty factor
to suppress the effects of leverage measurements. The details are as follows:
minimize
x
ρ(r) =
m∑
i=1
ρ(ri)
subject to z = h(x) + r
where z, h(x) are the same as in (5.1), and ρ(ri) is a function of the measurement residual ri, which
is defined as:
ρ(ri) =

1
2r
2
i /σ
2
i |ri/σi| ≤ a · ωi
a · ωi|ri/σi| − 12a2 · ω2i otherwise
where a is a constant ranging from 1 to 3 and ωi is defined as:
ωi = min{1, [1 − KiiKii ]} (5.27)
Note that when a is infinity, the SHGM is equivalent to WLS.
We now need to derive an algorithm that finds the solution. To this end, we propose an
algorithm based on numerically stable iteratively re-weighted least squares method [67]. Writing
the KKT necessary conditions for a minimum of ρ(r):
∂ρ
∂x
=
∂ρ
∂r
· ∂r
∂x
= 0⇒
m∑
i=1
∂ρ
∂ri
· ∂ri
∂x
= 0
⇒
m∑
i=1
Υ(ri) · Hi = 0⇒
m∑
i=1
Υ(ri)
ri
· ri · Hi = 0
where Υ(ri) =
∂ρ
∂ri
. Write the above in matrix form, we have:
HT · Q · r = 0 (5.28)
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where Q is a m dimensional diagonal matrix and Qii =
Υ(ri)
ri
, defined as:
Qii =

1
σ2i
|ri/σi| ≤ a · ωi
a·ωi
riσi
· sign(ri) otherwise
(5.29)
Also, from the first order Taylor approximation, we have:
h(x) ≈ h(xk) + H ·
i
xk (5.30)
where k means the kth iteration. Since r = z − h(x), rk = z − h(xk), combined with (5.28), we get
the equation in kth iteration:
HT · Q · H
i
xk = HT · Q · rk (5.31)
Note that matrix Q is keeping updated based on the residual r of current iteration. The algorithm
is given in detail in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Re-weighted Least Square Solver
1: Initial guess x0.
2: k = 0.
3: Calculate ωi based on (5.27).
4: while true do
5: rk = z − h(xk)
6: Update Q based on (5.29).
7:
a
xk = (HT · Q · H)−1HT · Q · rk
8: xk+1 = xk +
a
xk
9: if | xk+1 − xk |< ϕ(threshold) then
10: return
11: else
12: k = k + 1
5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we validate the proposed attacking strategy and countermeasure using IEEE
14 test system. The one-line diagram of the test system is displayed in Figure 5.4. It is provided
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with 12 power injection measurements and 13 power flow measurements in normal steady state. In
the following, IN i denotes a power injection measurement at Bus i and FL i − j denotes a power
flow measurement from Bus i to Bus j. The negative measurement means the power flow direction
is the opposite to the assumed one. We extract the configurations and parameters of the IEEE test
systems from MATPOWER 4.0 [68], a MATLAB package for solving power flow problems.
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G
Power injection measurement
Power flow measurement
14
10
9
7
4
3
G
Figure 5.4 IEEE 14 bus test system
We first investigate the LPAttack principle in Theorem 2 by demonstrating the relationship
between the perturbation of power measurement zi and the corresponding required minimum in-
crease of Kii. Table 5.1 lists the results for several chosen power measurements in IEEE 14 test
system. Note 4zi =| z′i − zi | and 4Kii = K′ii − Kii. 4zi is set to be 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10 respectively. All
numerical values of the measurements are in per-unit system with base value 100MVA(pu).
The results from Table 5.1 imply some interesting facts. First, as suggested by the bold numerical
values, when the measurements like IN1 and FL1-2 are perturbed in a large magnitude(4zi =
5, 10), the required increase of Kii from Theorem 2 will result in a value greater than 1, which
is impossible to achieve. In this case, it actually indicates that other diagonal values of matrix
K should also be increased to satisfy Theorem 1 such that the measurement perturbation can be
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Table 5.1 Leverage-Point Attack in IEEE 14 bus system
Meas. IN1 FL1-2 IN4 IN5 IN6 FL4-5 FL5-6
Normal zi 125.48 84.70 -27.39 -4.36 -6.42 -35.38 24.52
Original Kii 0.3969 0.2171 0.6043 0.5536 0.5902 0.2179 0.1967
4Kii(4zi=0.5) 0.0637 0.0413 0.0140 0.0053 0.0034 0.0181 0.0126
4Kii(4zi=1) 0.1275 0.0864 0.0283 0.0101 0.0070 0.0364 0.0254
4Kii(4zi=2) 0.2553 0.1733 0.0567 0.0319 0.0151 0.0738 0.0518
4Kii(4zi=5) 0.6395 0.4380 0.0602 0.0348 0.0452 0.1914 0.1367
4Kii(4zi=10) 1.2827 0.8908 0.1143 0.0948 0.1156 0.4060 0.2976
marked. Second, we also discover that in general, when the original magnitude of measurement
is large, the corresponding required 4Kii is relatively large. This indicates that the attack against
measurements with smaller magnitude is easier to succeed. Finally, when the original value of Kii
is large, such as IN4 and IN5, the perturbations of corresponding measurements only require small
increase in Kii. This suggests that the attacks against measurements with larger Kii are more prone
to success. Figure shows the identified vulnerable meters in the IEEE 14 bus system.
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Measurements with high leverage
IEEE Standard 14 Bus System
 Small reactance branch
Bus incident to a large 
number of branches
Figure 5.5 Most vulnerable meters in IEEE 14 bus system
Next we will study how the changes in parameters of branch susceptance and measurement
error variances will affect the leverages of measurements. Figure 5.6 gives the result for IN5.
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Figure 5.6 Relations between leverage of IN5 and value of parameters
Figure 5.7 shows the residuals after measurement perturbation in both WLS and our counter-
measure. We can see that the residual in countermeasure is significantly larger than in WLS, and
it can correctly fire the bad data detection alarm in most cases. The a in countermeasure is set to
be 2.4 in our simulations.
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Figure 5.7 Residual in conventional WLS and our proposed countermeasure
Finally, the effect of LPAttack on power market, particularly on Locational Marginal Price
(LMP), is examined. LMP is the core variable in market operations and obtained through the real-
time pricing models [69]. The real-time pricing models are built on the power flow and network
topology measurement results given by the state estimation process, thus our proposed leverage-
point attacks would directly affect the LMPs by manipulating the power flow measurements. We
adopt the Ex-post pricing model (e.g., in ISO New England, PJM, and Midwest ISO) in [70] and
conduct the sensitivity analysis of LMP at each of the 14 buses with respect to perturbations in
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different power flow measurements. Figure 6.22 shows the LMP sensitivities of all 14 buses with
respect to the changes in three measurements: IN1, IN4 and FL5-6. The unit on vertical axis is
($/MWh)/(puMVA). We can see that the perturbation in measurements would have greater impact
on the LMPs of nearby buses than other buses. For example, perturbation of IN4 has larger impact
on LMPs of bus 4,5 and almost no impact on bus 13,14. Also, the perturbation in one measurement
could yield either positive or negative sensitivities to LMPs at different buses.
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Figure 5.8 LMP sensitivities of all buses with respect to measurements
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CHAPTER 6
SCOREPLUS: A SOFTWARE-HARDWARE HYBRID AND FEDERATED
EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENT FOR SMART GRID
In this chapter, we present ScorePlus [8], a Software-Hardware Hybrid and Federated Exper-
iment Environment for Smart Grid.
6.1 Overall System Design
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the overall architecture of our platform. ScorePlus consists of Graph-
ical User Interface (GUI), software emulator, and hardware testbed. The GUI connects with soft-
ware emulator and hardware testbed remotely through Internet. Since the software emulator and
the hardware testbed expose the same architecture and interfaces to the GUI, the user can run
the same Smart Grid application test case on either of them without any migration issue. Mean-
while, by integrating the communication network and power network from both software emulator
and hardware testbed, multiple software emulators and hardware testbeds are able to connect and
interact through Internet. Upon specifying the connection interfaces between each other, com-
munication and power flow could be established between each individual node, such as a virtual
demander in software emulator and a real supplier in hardware testbed.
6.2 Software Emulator
As shown in Figure 6.2, the software emulator consists of Service Layer, Virtual nodes, Linux
Ethernet Bridging, Communication Module, and Power Module. The Service Layer is essentially
a socket server that provides various event handlers to the formatted messages from external inter-
acting system. It is responsible for initializing the emulation case, collecting and forwarding the
system request, and managing multiple emulation sessions, etc. The software emulator partially
leverages our previous development in [71]. In this work, we specifically implement the network
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tunnels between virtual network interfaces and physical network interfaces, and upgrade the power
network model through domain decompositions, and increase more message handles in the Service
Layer to respond to external interactions, etc. All the improvements in the software emulator are
intended to facilitate its integration with the hardware testbed.
6.2.1 Virtual Nodes: Light Weighted Virtualization
The emulation feature of software emulator is implemented using Linux network namespace
techniques, which is a recent light weighted paravirtualization technique supported by mainstream
Linux kernel. By calling the clone() system call, each created virtual node can have its own in-
stance of Linux OS network stack and process space while sharing the same local file systems and
hardware with other virtual nodes. From the perspective of codes running inside, each virtual node
is just another piece of hardware platform controlled by Linux OS. Therefore, the virtual nodes can
directly execute unmodified Smart Grid application codes from physical Linux-embedded devices,
and vice versa. Figure 6.3 illustrates the software emulator scalability that about 180 virtual nodes
can be created on a 64 bits HP desktop with Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU E5700 @ 3.00GHz and
4GiB memory.
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6.2.2 Linux Ethernet Bridging and Communication Module
All the virtual nodes in the emulator are equipped with virtual Ethernet interfaces and they are
linked by Linux Ethernet Bridging. This approach provides underlying communication capabilities
between each virtual node. Based on Linux Ethernet Bridging, the communication module in
software emulator provides comprehensive support of various wired and wireless communication
network models. All the models are simply the manipulations of the underlying communication
infrastructure. More importantly, virtual Ethernet interfaces can be directly mapped to a physical
Ethernet interface on the emulation host, such that all the traffic passing through that physical
port can be transferred to the emulation environment. This enables the interactions between the
software emulation environment with outside physical networks.
We employ the above key feature to achieve the integration of communication networks be-
tween the software emulator and hardware testbed, which will be presented in Section V.
6.2.3 Power Module
The power module in software emulator emulates the power flows analysis within Smart Grid
and also provides implementations of pre-defined energy models. The power module receives ini-
tial power network topology, energy model configuration information and the connection interface
information from service layer to formulate the power network model.
Power Network Model: General Description The power network model is a DC current
model to emulate DC power flow analysis. Assume a power grid is composed of n nodes and b
branches. Since the power network dynamics is subject to Kirchhoff’s current and voltage laws
(KCL and KVL), in order to calculate the voltages of all nodes, we apply nodal analysis to the grid
and get the linear equations for the whole system:
AV = I (6.1)
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where coefficient matrix A is the (n − 1) × (n − 1) reduced nodal admittance matrix since we have
chosen a reference node. Let Nbr(i) represents the neighbour set of node i in the power network,
we get:
ai j =

∑
s∈Nbr(i)
gis i = j.
−gi j j ∈ Nbr(i)
0 otherwise
(6.2)
gi j is the admittance between node i and node j, V and I are the unknown node voltage vector and
the known nodal current injection vector, respectively. Figure 6.4 shows the data flow diagram of
power module.
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Figure 6.4 Data flow diagram of Power Module
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Incremental updating Based on previous model, let’s consider the situation when the
power network topology changes. Suppose the power grid status changes, such as the admittance
between node i and node j is changed by ∆gi j. So the new coefficient matrix A˜ can be written as:
A˜ = A + U∆gi jUT (6.3)
where
U =
[
0 · · · 1 · · · −1 · · · 0
]T
i j
Particularly, the changed admittance ∆gi j equals to −gi j when the branch is removed and ∆gi j = gi j
when a new branch is added. Notice that [72]
A˜−1 = A−1 − A−1U
(
∆gi j−1 + UT A−1U
)−1
UT A−1 (6.4)
then we can get the A˜−1 with a much lower computation cost when we store previously computed
A−1.
Power Network Model: Domain Decomposition Power network is generally a network
of loosely coupled sub power networks. Each sub network is a relatively independent partition of
the whole energy system and only few in-between connection lines join them together. Inside each
sub network, we divide the nodes into two sets:
• Internal nodes: nodes that only have connections with the nodes inside the same sub network.
• Boundary nodes: nodes that have connections with the nodes in other sub networks.
The architecture of the power network is illustrated in Figure 6.5. Based on the previous analysis,
we apply the Schur complement domain decomposition method [73] to our power network model.
Specifically, suppose there are k sub networks, by grouping the internal nodes of each sub network
and putting all the boundary nodes of the network in the back, we formulate the nodal analysis
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Figure 6.5 The general architecture of power network
model for the whole power network as the following:
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=

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
(6.5)
Notice that B is the set of all boundary nodes in the whole network, consisting of B1, B2, ..., Bk.
Therefore, YAiB only has non zero entries in its submatrix YAiBi , for all i = 1, 2, ...k.
From (6.5), if the voltages for boundary nodes set VB is known, then the voltages for the nodes
in each sub network can be calculated as the following:
YAiAiVAi = IAi − YAiBVB,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}. (6.6)
Meanwhile, if we keep the corresponding part for the boundary node set B in equation (6.5), we
can get:
Y˜BBVB = I˜B (6.7)
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where
Y˜BB = YBB −
k∑
i=1
YBAiYAiAi
−1YAiB (6.8)
I˜B = IB −
k∑
i=1
YBAiYAiAi
−1IAi (6.9)
Define
xi = YBAiYAiAi
−1YAiB (6.10)
yi = YBAiYAiAi
−1IAi (6.11)
for all i = 1, 2, ...k. Notice that xi and yi only requires local information for sub system i.
We employ the above key feature to achieve the integration of power networks between the
software emulator and the hardware testbed, which treats each of them as a sub network of the
whole power network. The details for that would be given in section V.
6.3 Hardware Testbed
Figure 6.6 shows the design of our hardware testbed, which follows the same architecture as
the software emulator. Each node in the hardware testbed is a physical energy devices emulating
an energy entity in Smart Grid system. Through communication interface and power interface, all
the energy devices are connected by communication network and power network.
6.3.1 Overview of Energy Devices
The hardware testbed is composed of the following energy devices to emulate the energy
entities in a Smart Grid system:
• 1 Supplier (This device emulates a general power generation. Output to the Smart Grid is
up to 200mA. The Smart Grid voltage is typically 2.5V, but it may be higher or lower when
source and load are unbalanced.)
• 5 Solar Panel Controller (Output is up to 30mA each, depending on light intensity.)
• 5 Wind Turbine Controller (Output is up to 30mA each, depending on wind intensity.)
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Figure 6.6 Design of Hardware Testbed
• 5 Storage (Capacitor bank with electronics. It can source or sink up to 50mA depending on
the demands of the Smart Grid system.)
• 15 Demander (A load only, drawing up to 20mA each from the Smart Grid.)
• 5 Topology Switch (Has 6 ports and can switch current flow in multiple ways. Must be able
to handle up to 300mA on all ports.)
• 1 Interface device, which serves as the energy tunnel when the hardware testbed is connected
with the software emulator.
Figure 6.7 shows various energy devices, solar panel and wind turbine in use. The LCD display
shows the current drawn and sourced by each energy device except the one in Topology Switch
Device, which displays the connection status between all the 6 ports. Figure 6.7 shows the energy
devices, the solar panel and the wind turbine when they are in use in the hardware testbed.
6.3.2 Energy Device Design Details
Each of the above energy device includes three boards: a Beagleboard [74], a Telosw board
[75] and an Energy board. Figure 6.8 shows the process of remote access and configuration of these
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Figure 6.7 Hardware Testbed
energy devices from GUI by the user. The user specify the hardware configurations from the GUI
and send requests to the Service Layer as formatted messages. Upon receiving and mapping these
messages, the Service Layer forwards the corresponding request to the Beagleboard of the desig-
nated energy device. Then the control program in that Beagleboard then will communicate with its
Telosw board, which ultimately interacts with the Energy board and put those configurations into
effect, such as load of the demander, output of the renewable controller and connection status of
the topology switch, etc. Likewise, the status of the energy devices are periodically queried and
reported to GUI backward. The roles of the above three boards are summarized as the following:
Energy DeviceService 
Layer
Energy board 
(different among different energy devices)
USB cable
Beagleboard
GUI Mapping
Forwarding
Querying
EthernetInternet
Telosw board
Formatted
Messages
mated
Figure 6.8 Remote access and configuration of energy devices
Beagleboard
• Interact with the Service Layer and control the behavior of each energy device correspond-
ingly.
• Provide Linux-based environment in each energy device to test the Smart Grid applications.
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• Enable the communications between each energy device, through both wired and wireless
networks.
Telosw board
• Adjust of smart resistors to emulate power profiles.
• Monitor/measure power generation and consumption rate of each energy device.
• Provide I/O to mating Energy board for LED and display.
Energy board
• Provide different DC current circuit to fulfill the corresponding power requirements of dif-
ferent devices.
Figure 6.9 Details of Solar Panel Controller
Figure 6.9 shows the architecture of a Solar Panel Controller. The Beagleboard provides
physical communication interfaces, such as the Ethernet port and mini USB to connect the wireless
radio. It is connected with TelosW board through USB cable such that the programs running in the
Beagleboard can directly access and control the energy profile through the TelosW. The TelosW is
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mated to the Energy board, which are all enclosed in a black plastic container. The port at the top
of the container is connected with a physical solar panel. There are three ports at the bottom of the
container. The left one serves as the power source of the device and the right one is the actually
power interface for Smart Grid system. The middle port is connected to the Ground.
Figure 6.10 Schematics of Energy Board on Solar Panel Controller
Figure 6.10 shows the schematics for the Energy board on Solar Panel Controller. An analog
voltage from the TelosW board indicates the amount of current output to the Smart Grid that is
desired (0 to 2.0V corresponds to 0 to 30mA of desired output). An analog voltage to the TelosW
board indicates the measured current output (0 to 2.0V corresponds to 0 to 30 mA of actual output
current). The Solar Cell input to the Energy Control board will have a capacitor of 10,000uF (C6)
for the purpose of temporarily storing energy from the generating source. 0.4 times the voltage on
this capacitor will be supplied to the TelosW board for the purpose of indicating energy capability
of the Solar Cell. The same device can be used for wind turbine control. Figure 6.11 shows a
sample current output of a Solar Panel Controller device when the solar panel is exposed to a 50W
3-level light intensity lamp over time. Figure 6.12(a) shows the relationship between voltage input
via current output in Controller device. Figure 6.12(b) shows the sreenshot of the ADC output
voltage of the Solar Panel Controller in oscilloscope. The voltage output is very stable and no
oscillation occurs.
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Figure 6.11 Sample Current Output of Solar Panel Controller
6.3.3 Power Network in Hardware Testbed: Dynamic Topology Configuration
The power network in hardware testbed connects all the energy devices through power in-
terfaces through power cables. To facilitate the dynamic configurations of various power network
topologies, we design the Topology Switch device as Figure (6.7(d)), which serves as the cur-
rent hub for all the other energy devices. The Topology Switch can be accessed and configured
dynamically through TelosW by the programs running inside the mated Beagleboard, such that
the connection status between the 6 ports can be changed accordingly. Different power network
topologies can be set up based on the users’ requirements. The connection status is also visualized
through the LCD. The Energy board of Topology Switch is shown in Figure 6.13.
6.3.4 Communication Network in Hardware Testbed: Wire and Wireless Network
The communication network in hardware testbed are set up to emulate the wire and wireless
communication in Smart Grid. The Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels are created
between each energy device above the underlying communication network, such that the physical
communication network can be unified with the ones in software emulator. For wired network, we
use Ethernet to connect each energy device.
For wireless network, we are employing the WISP-2 outdoor antenna from ALFA Network,
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Inc, which can be directly connected with Beagleboard through USB cable. WISP-2 is a Low-Cost
IEEE 802.11n outdoor AP/CPE operating in 2.4GHz band that is also compliant with the standard
IEEE 802.11b/g. In our indoor environment, the radio range of each node covers all the other
nodes, so physically, all nodes can communicate with each other. To formulate a wireless mesh
network with a specific topology, the iptables tool chain is employed within each energy device.
Through ipables, we can filter the sent and received packets for each node, such that they can only
communicate with the nodes as specified. Then the corresponding wireless network topology is
formulated. The performance testing result from iperf tool are listed in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 Performance of wireless network in hardware testbed
hops 1 2 3 4 5
bandwidth 1.05 Mbps 624 Kbps 416 Kbps 316 Kbps 242 Kbps
jitter 1.83ms 37.14ms 55.91ms 83.26ms 122.55ms
Table 6.2 Optimal attack vector a against IEEE14 with different sizes of ζA
size of ζA optimal attack vector a
2 (0,63.0),(2,34.4)
4 (0,65.1),(2,32.0),(14,48.5),(34,-64.0)
6 (0,69.3),(2,32.0),(3,-48.0),(14,-48.0),(15,32.0),(34,-64.0)
8 (0,79.0),(2,32.0),(3,-32.0),(4,-48.0),(5,32.0),(14,52.3),(15,32.0),(34,-64.0)
10 (0,103.0),(2,32.0),(3,-48.0),(4,-64.0),(5,32.0),(14,68.0),(15,34.0),(17,32.0),
(34,-64.0),(35,-33.0)
6.4 Integrating Software Emulators and Hardware Testbeds
ScorePlus supports scalable distributed experiments such that multiple software emulators
and hardware testbeds running at different (local or remote) locations are able to connect and
form a larger Smart Grid system. Here we only present the integration between software emulator
and hardware testbed. Note integrations only among software emulators or only among hardware
testbeds follow the same mechanism. In order to enable the interactions between the software
emulator and the hardware testbed, both the communication network and power network within
them should be integrated.
6.4.1 Integrating the Communication Network
The communication network emulated in software emulator runs in real time, so they can be
connected to live physical networks. We build GRE tunnels between/among software emulation
servers and the energy devices in hardware testbed. Figure 6.14 illustrates the details of how a
virtual node in software emulator sends a packet to a physical node in hardware testbed. GRE
tunneling is built between the software emulation server and the gateway machine of the hardware
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testbed. The actual IP address of the two are in domain 131.96.x.0/24. When the packet reaches
the edge of the network in software emulator, which is the physical network interface of emulation
server, the tunnel entry in routing table would enable the encapsulation of the packet with GRE
header and the tunnel destination, such that they can reach the hardware testbed environment.
Also, by using this approach, all the ip addresses in the experiment environment are in 10.0.x.x/16
domain, and the physical networks can be abstracted as needed for the experiments.
Hardware TestbedSoftware Emulator 
Server
Internet Network 
interface
Virtual 
node
GRE Tunnel
10.0.1.2/24 10.0.2.2/24
10.0.3.1/24
10.0.3.2/24
Tunnel 0 Tunnel 0
131.96.x.1/24 131.96.x.2/24
Dest Tun Dest
10.0.2.0/24
Gateway
10.0.2.2 131.96.x.2GRE
Ethernet
Linux Ethernet 
Bridge
131.96.x.2
Figure 6.14 Communication between virtual node and real node through GRE tunneling
Figure 6.15 presents the performance of integrated communication network by showing the
time elapsed for Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) routing protocol to converge. We employ differ-
ent numbers of hardware testbed nodes and record time under different network delays set up in
software emulator. As shown in Figure 6.15, when hardware testbed node is integrated within the
communication network of the software emulator (the number of real nodes from 0 to 2), there is
a dramatic increase in elapsed time. This indicates the GRE tunneling does impose a significant
overhead. When the network delay in software emulator is increased to be comparable to the one
in hardware testbed, which is 10ms this case, we see that the number of hardware testbed nodes
involved in experiment doesn’t really affect much the convergence speed of routing. The virtual
and physical network gives about the same performance.
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6.4.2 Integrating the Power Network
The power network integration employs the domain decomposition model in Figure 6.5. In-
stances from either hardware testbeds or software emulators are treated as sub networks of whole
power network.
Specifically, suppose there are already k connected instances of software emulators and hard-
ware testbeds, and another instance k + 1 joins in run time. Also assume that the k + 1 instance
connects with the instance set E directly, E ⊆ {1, 2, ..., k}. Then the composition process for each
computation host i, i = 1, 2, ..., k, k + 1, is executed as the following:
• If i ∈ E, then adjust the boundary node set Bi by adding the new boundary nodes connected
with instance k + 1 and also adjust the internal node set Ai by removing the corresponding
boundary nodes connected with instance k + 1. Compute xi and yi based on equations (6.10)
and (6.11) respectively. Send the results to the coordinator host.
• The coordinator first reforms the boundary node set B by adding the new boundary nodes
in Bi, i ∈ E and Bk+1, then rebuilt YBB and IB for the whole system. Secondly, it collects xi
and yi from each host, and calculate VB based on equations (6.7) (6.8) (6.9). Finally, it sends
YBBVB back to each host.
• Each host i receives YBBVB from the coordinator and calculate VAi based on equation (6.6).
After the above process, each sub power network can set its updated status based on the calculated
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results. If the sub network is a software emulator, we can update the status in our programs di-
rectly to achieve the resulting effects. However, if the sub network is a hardware testbed, physical
changes must be made. To this end, we employ our specifically designed Interface device, which is
essentially a combined supplier and demander with large capacity. When the calculated result in-
dicates the hardware testbed sub network is requesting power from outside domains, the Interface
device is set as a power supplier to provide corresponding power to the testbed. When the calcu-
lated result indicates the hardware testbed sub network is providing power to outside domains, the
Interface device is set as a power demander to absorb power from the testbed correspondingly.
When one sub network is disconnected with the rest of the system, the steps are similar with
the above except that instead of adding boundary nodes to the boundary set, the coordinator will
remove the boundary nodes related with the exiting instances.
6.5 Deployment Plugin for ScorePlus in OpenStack Cloud Computing Platform
ScorePlus employs Linux containers (LXC) to achieve virtualizations in software emulator.
As shown in Figure 6.3, a general PC can support test cases with at most 180 virtual nodes. As
the scale of the test case grows, it becomes indispensable to deploy the software emulator in cloud
computing infrastructure to increase its scalability. Moreover, when setting up multiple software
emulation instances with different configurations, it would be convenient to just specify different
parameters somehow without starting from scratch each time. To facilitate these deployment pro-
cesses, we particularly implement a deployment plugin for ScorePlus in OpenStack cloud comput-
ing platform, which is essentially a resource plugin in Heat, the OpenStack Orchestration service.
6.5.1 OpenStack and Heat
OpenStack is a free and open-source cloud computing software platform, which is a global
collaboration of developers and cloud computing technologists to produce the open standards for
both public and private clouds. The OpenStack software consists of a group of interrelated projects
to control various aspects of cloud infrastructure, such as authentication, orchestration, computing,
networking, and storage etc.
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Heat is the main project in OpenStack Orchestration program, which provides a template
based orchestration to describe a cloud application. A Heat template allows instantiations of vari-
ous OpenStack resource types, such as instances, floating ips, volumes, security groups, and users,
etc. All the resources allocated for a Heat template are managed as a single stack. More impor-
tantly, Heat allows developers to add customized resource plugins, such that new resources can be
integrated into the OpenStack frameworks to create cloud applications.
6.5.2 Implementation of Heat Plugin for ScorePlus
We design and implement a customized Heat resource plugin for ScorePlus in OpenStack,
such that ScorePlus can be deployed and reused the same as any other resources in OpenStack
cloud applications. In this way, ScorePlus can run on different computing, networking, and storage
resources with different configurations, which are all based on the specifications in a Heat template.
The resource plugin extends a base Resource class, and the lifecycle is managed by a series of rele-
active
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Figure 6.16 State Transition Diagram of ScorePlus Resource Plugin in OpenStack
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vant handler methods, including create, update, suspend, resume and delete. Figure 6.16 illustrates
the state transition diagram of ScorePlus resource plugin within Heat engine. Specifically, the
following key methods extended from the heat.engine.resource.Resource class are implemented to
handle the entire lifecycle:
• handle create: Deploy ScorePlus on the dependent server and start the ScorePlus service
socket.
• handle update: Update current ScorePlus instance.
• handle suspend: Pause the ScorePlus service socket process.
• handle resume: Resume the ScorePlus service socket process.
• handle delete: Remove ScorePlus related process and software on the dependent server.
Figure 6.17 Heat Orchestration Template for ScorePlus
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Figure 6.18 Openstack nova console output after ScorePlus deployment
6.5.3 Sample Use
Figure 6.17 shows a sample Heat stack template using ScorePlus resource plugin, which also
includes other resources like OS::Nova::Server, OS::Heat::SoftwareConfig and OS::Heat::MultipartMime,
etc. Figure 6.18 captures the corresponding console output after the deployment of this template
in OpenStack. With respect to the dependencies between different resources, we can also see the
dependency topology for the allocated resources from this template stack in Figure 6.19.
Figure 6.19 Resource Dependency Topology within ScorePlus Heat template
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6.6 Evaluation and Experimentation
In this section, we demonstrate and evaluate the capabilities of ScorePlus to support cyber-
physical analysis in Smart Grid, particularly in Microgrid [76]. The future Smart Grid is expected
to be an integration of Microgrids featured by localized power generation, storage and consumption
[77]. Microgrid works as an independent local power system that has the flexibility to connect
(connecting mode) and disconnect (islanding mode) from the main grid as needed in order to
minimize the energy cost and maximize the grid stability [78]. Figure 6.20 illustrates a typical
Microgrid structure. Note that in ScorePlus we use Topology Switch to serve as circuit breakers.
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Figure 6.20 Typical Microgrid Structure
6.6.1 Experiment setup
The test case is created upon the AMI network test case in [79] and demand response model
in [80]. The demand response model is also run in @GridLAB-D as a comparison for accuracy.
We investigate the Microgrid demand response behavior in one virtual day. For each virtual time
period h in the virtual day (2 real time seconds), h = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...23, each kind of nodes behaves as
the following:
• Supplier: Providing power with maximum 2kw to the whole grid and broadcasting its hourly
price [80] to all the topology switches. Calculating the bills for each demander based on the
real time price and the collected energy consumption from Demanders.
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• Topology Switch: Receiving the energy price information from the Supplier and then relay
the messages to the demanders immediately.
• Solar Panel: When h ∈ [0, 5] ⋃[19, 23], setting its maximum output to 0. When h ∈ [6 : 18],
randomly setting its maximum output between 200w and 300w.
• Wind Turbine: Randomly Setting its maximum output between 100w and 200w for each
hour.
• Storage: Its capacity is set to 1kwh with initial energy 0.1kwh; Sending its current energy
residual to demanders and charges/discharges with maximum 100w as requested from De-
manders.
• Demander: Either critical Demander or adjustable Demander. Critical Demander must
work at 200w all the time. Adjustable Demander receives price from Topology switch and
energy residual from Storage and adjust its setpoint based on the demand response model in
[80].
An AMI communication network is set up between all the nodes, which consists of both Ethernet
and IEEE 802.11 RF Mesh network with 54Mbps bandwidth, 0.1% packet loss rate. All the above
node behaviors are implemented by the control programs running inside each node. Figure 6.21
shows Xterminal for a Demander node. We use command ps aux to check programs running
inside. They include the OSPF routing process and the demander energy daemon process.
Figure 6.21 Smart Grid applications running in a Demander node
Five Microgrids are created as in Table II, running on four software emulation servers and
one hardware testbed respectively.
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Table 6.3 Number of nodes in each Microgrid
Microgrid ID Type Demander Supplier Switch Solar Turbine Storage Total
1 Software Emulator 11 1 5 4 4 5 30
2 Hardware Testbed 11 1 5 4 4 5 30
3 Software Emulator 22 2 10 8 8 10 60
4 Software Emulator 33 3 15 12 12 15 90
5 Software Emulator 55 5 25 20 20 25 150
6.6.2 Islanding Mode
In islanding mode, each Microgrid is working independently and self-sustained. We first
examine Microgrid 1 and 2 for comparison. Figure 6.22 shows the real-time energy price and the
adjustable Demander energy consumption over time, one in software emulator, one in hardware
testbed and one in GridLAB-D as comparison for accuracy. We can see that the control program
for the price responsive model in [80] tends to shift the energy consumption to the lower price
period of the day. In addition, we can see the difference of the power profiles between the two
adjustable Demanders. Theoretically, the two curves should be exactly the same since they are
controlled by the same program as previously specified. However, since the software emulator is
event-based processing, it can only update with a large discrete step size. As a comparison, due to
the high ADC sampling rate of TelosW, the one in hardware testbed has the advantage of capturing
the transient dynamics in a finer grain.
Figure 6.23 shows the renewable share of total energy consumption over time in all five Mi-
crogrids. We can see that generally, when the real time energy price increases, the renewable
share increases correspondingly. In addition, as the size of the Microgrid increases, the renewable
share become less sensitive to the price fluctuations since more renewable energy surplus can be
distributed and stored by the demand response process.
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6.6.3 Connecting Mode
In connecting mode, Microgrid is connected with each other. We first examine our imple-
mentation for the integrations between different Microgrids. The software emulation servers and
hardware testbed are connected with each other through Internet. Note that we specifically design
the five Microgrids in Table II, such that Microgrid 1 connected with 2 is the same as Microgrid
3, and Microgrid 3 with 4 is the same as Microgrid 5. The study case No. and the Microgrids
connected are listed in Table III.
Table 6.4 Cases in Connecting Mode
Case No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Microgrid connected 1,2 3 2,3 4 3,4 5 1,2,4 1,3,4,5
Figure 6.24(a) shows the wind turbine output in case 1 and 2. The two curves conform with each
other and the integration between software emulator with hardware testbed preserves the power
profiles accurately. Figure 6.24(b) shows the ping time between two farthest nodes and the time
needed for OSPF routing to converage in case 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. It indicates that for communication
network, the integrations with software emulators introduce minor delays but major delays with
hardware testbed, which is about 0.57ms difference in ping time.
Deployment in OpenStack For the multiple ScorePlus instantiations in case 8, we employ
the ScorePlus resource plugin to deploy them all at one time in OpenStack. In particular, Neutron
networking resources are integrated into the stack template, such that a private internal subnet is
created to connect all 5 ScorePlus servers, all of which uses a common gateway router to commu-
nicate with external networks. The result networking topology of the multiple ScorePlus servers
in OpenStack are illustrated in Figure 6.25.
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Figure 6.25 Networking topology of multiple ScorePlus servers after deployment in Openstack
Topology Attacks In connecting mode, the influence between different Microgrids becomes
extremely important since the failure in one Microgrid could impact the stability of other Micro-
grids. To this end, we conduct contingency analysis for case 1 under topology attacks, in which
attackers intend to disrupt the normal physical conditions of power system through malicious con-
trol of Topology Switch. As in Figure 6.26, suppose attackers inject a malicious control program
to the Topology Switch n4 in house 3 and runs it at time h=7, such that it disconnects house 4 with
house 5 as well as the hardware testbed. Only port 2, 3 and 4 are connected. In normal condition,
the Topology Switch in house 3 is set such that port 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are all connected. So the
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power needed in house 3 can be supplied from house 4, house 5 and the power network hardware
testbed. After manipulating the connection status in the Topology Switch, the previous balanced
power flow in the network is changed to unbalanced one, leading to a dramatic increase in the
power flows (indicated by the red bold line in GUI). Meanwhile, since the hardware testbed is not
providing power to the software emulator any more but the power generation is not aware of the
attack at the moment, the extra power flow would be inevitably forwarded to the Storage devices
in hardware testbed, which results in a sudden peak charging rate at the storage device, as marked
by the red circle. The charging rate will reach a sudden peak around h=7 but return a higher but
relative stable level afterwards since more energy surplus is being forwarded to Storage device.
The same experiment is also conducted by replacing the hardware testbed with another software
emulator. We can see that the hardware testbed could capture the power dynamics in a finer grain.
Topology 
Attack
Figure 6.26 Cyber-physical attack on Topology Switch
6.6.4 Comprehensive Cyber-Physical Attacks
This testing case we created is based on the AMI network test case from American Electric
Power Company[79] and the IEEE PES 37 bus distribution system test feeders [81]. Through this
case, we further illustrate the advantages of our platform over software simulators: 1) the actual
control program written in C language (either correct or malicious modified) can be directly run
on each virtual node; 2) the real time cyber-physical impacts (altered system routing table entries
and power flow perturbations) of the control programs can be demonstrated. Figure 6.27 shows the
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Figure 6.27 Comprehensive cyber attack case
building blocks of our experimental scenario:
• Operation layer: The control program in control center broadcasts real-time energy prices
every 5 minutes and also collects meter reading data through AMI Head-End. Meanwhile,
the control center also calculates the bills for each house, based on the real time price and
the collected energy consumption data.
• Customer layer: The IEEE 37 bus distribution test feeders is set up to provide power for 200
residential houses. Each house is equipped with loads including a water heater, a dryer, a
PHEV, a solar panel, and a storage. Moreover, a smart meter is employed to serve as the
interface between the power network and AMI for each house. The program running in
smart meter responses to the real time prices to adjust the setpoint of appliances within each
house correspondingly based on the price-responsive control model in [80].
• AMI network: AMI enables communications and interactions between/within the operation
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layer and the customer layer. The control center and AMI Head-End is connected through
Internet. AMI Head-End, the relay nodes and the smart meters are formed as a IEEE 802.11
Radio Frequency Mesh network.
Suppose the customer under smart meter X wants to manipulate his energy bill without being
caught. In order to achieve this, he launches a Distributed Denial-of-service attack to the bi-
direction data flow within AMI, which consists of the energy consumption data from the smart
meters to the AMI Head-End, and the energy price data from the AMI Head-End to the smart
meters. For the energy consumption data, the attacker modifies the ones from smart meter X and
his targeted neighbors, such that each targeted neighbor has an increase in the reported energy
consumption compared to the actual consumption, and the smart meter X has a decrease equal
to the total increase of its targeted neighbors in the reported energy consumption. In this way,
from the perspective of utility company, the total energy provided still conforms to the total energy
being billed. For the energy price data, the attacker modifies the price to a lower value, such that
based on the demand response model, the actual energy consumption of each targeted neighbors
will also increase. In this case, from the perspective of each targeted neighbor, the minor increase
in the reported energy consumption data due to attack will become even less noticeable.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 6.28, the customer of smart meter X attacks three relay nodes
at the same time: its own direct cluster head (Relay 2) and two neighbor cluster heads (Relay 1 and
3). Originally, Relay 1 and Relay 3 will directly interact with Relay 4 for the bi-direction data. We
can see this from the result of route command in the terminal of Relay 1. To reach 192.169.0.4,
which is the IP address of Relay 4, no intermediate gateway is needed and packets can be simply
forwarded through interface eth0. However, after attack, there is one extra high priority entry in
the routing table of Relay 1 such that the packets designated to 192.169.0.4 will be forwarded to
192.169.0.2 first instead of the original one hop reach. As a result, for Relay 2, besides the data
packets of the 10 customers within its own cluster, it will also intercept the data packets of the
other 20 customers within the clusters of Relay 1 and 3. By making the three Relay nodes working
in concert to compromise the data, customer X could dramatically reduces its own reported energy
usage. As shown in Figure 6.29, for smart meter X, even though the actual energy usage across
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the day is 64kwh, the reported data is manipulated to 35kwh. The remaining 64 − 35 = 29kwh are
evenly added to the other 29 customers’ reported data. In this way, from the perspective of utility
company, the total energy consumed still conforms with the total energy being billed. Moreover,
from the perspective of each of the other 29 customers’, since only 29/29 = 1kwh is added to
their energy consumption, which usually results in about 0.1$ increase in their bills,it is very much
likely that the customer will just let it go. Also note that since the energy price is modified to
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a lower value after the attack, the real power consumption paradigm of the attacked neighbors
changes dramatically, compared to the normal situation when the correct real time energy price is
given. As shown in Figure 6.30, the real power consumption of the attacked neighbors stays at
a relatively higher level all the time after the attack and the demand response through real time
pricing is not working any more. If more neighbors are involved in the attack, this will severely
increase load of the system, which can result in a higher cost of power transmission or even an
outage. An effective approach to detect this kind of attack is by monitoring the network traffic.
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Figure 6.30 The total real power consumption of the attacked neighbors
As shown in Figure 6.31, since the routing path of the packets is changed and much more data
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packets are forwarded to Relay 2, the throughput of Relay 2 will be increased unusually from the
moment of attack. Also, the network traffic congestion at Relay 2 will result in an increase in the
communication delay from Relay 1 to the AMI meter head.
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Figure 6.31 Throughput and Communication delay
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present the design, implementation and evaluation of ScorePlus, a
software-hardware hybrid and federated experiment environment for Smart Grid. Our platform
provides an extendable design paradigm for the creation of general cyber-physical testbeds. Test-
ing cases such as distributed control algorithms, demand responses, and cyber-physical security
issues, can all be evaluated in our platform. Future work could investigate the design of more
hardware components like Phaser Measurement Unit and the decrease in system integration over-
head. The ScorePlus codes including both software emulator and hardware testbed are open source
released at https://sourceforge.net/projects/scorepluset/.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation addresses two important research aspects about cyber-physical security of
Smart Grid: (i) The construction, impact and countermeasure of data integrity attacks; and (ii)
The design and implementation of general cyber-physical security experiment platform. For data
integrity attacks: based on the system model of state estimation process in Smart Grid, firstly, a
data integrity attack model is formulated, such that the attackers can generate financial benefits
from the real-time electrical market operations. Then, to reduce the required knowledge about
the targeted power system when launching attacks, an online attack approach is proposed, such
that the attacker is able to construct the desired attacks without the network information of power
system. Furthermore, a network information attacking strategy is proposed, in which the most
vulnerable meters can be directly identified and the desired measurement perturbations can be
achieved by strategically manipulating the network information. Besides the attacking strategies,
corresponding countermeasures based on the sparsity of attack vectors and robust state estimator
are provided respectively. For the experiment platform: ScorePlus, a software-hardware hybrid
and federated experiment environment for Smart Grid, is presented. ScorePlus incorporates both
software emulator and hardware testbed, such that they all follow the same architecture, and the
same Smart Grid application program can be tested on either of them without any modification.
ScorePlus provides a federated environment such that multiple software emulators and hardware
testbeds at different locations are able to connect and form a unified Smart Grid system. ScorePlus
software is encapsulated as a resource plugin in OpenStack cloud computing platform, such that it
supports massive deployments with large scale test cases in cloud infrastructure.
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